Authority and Identity — The Invariance Hypothesis II*

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Autorität und Identität — Die Invarianzhypothese II

Inhalt: Als Beitrag zum Problem der Kontinuität sozialer Modernisierungsprozesse behauptete ein früherer Aufsatz die historische Invarianz der gesellschaftlich legitimierenden Autoritätscodes. Diese Argumentation wird hier im Sinne Durkheims fortgeführt, indem a) Fakten präsentiert werden, die vermuten lassen, daß unterschiedliche Gesellschaften verschiedene Individualismus-Typen hervorbringen; b) gezeigt wird, wie sich das Streben nach individueller Autonomie und das zunehmende Verlangen nach Legitimierung von Macht gegenseitig verstärken; und c) die Hypothese formuliert wird, daß Modernisierung keinen Wandel der Autoritätscodes bedeutet, sondern vielmehr eine Steigerung der internen Kohärenz aller Autoritätsbeziehungen durch die Verbreitung der nationenspezifischen Autoritätscodes von der staatlichen in andere institutionelle Sphären der Gesellschaft.

Abstract: Addressed to the theme of continuity in modernizing change, a prior paper argued for invariance in society's legitimacy code of authority since the historical stage of social evolution. In the spirit of Durkheim this effort completes the argument by: a) presenting facts suggestive of cross-societally variant types of individualisms; b) showing how a search for individual autonomy and the increasing demands to legitimate power reinforce each other; and c) suggesting that modernization does not involve change in authority codes but rather growth in internal coherence of all authority relations through the spread of nation-specific authority codes from the governmental into other institutional spheres of society.

Introduction

A first essay on this theme attempted to incorporate history into modernization theory of the systemic functional variety (BAUM 1977). It took the form of arguing — with fact and theory — the hypothesis that legitimacy codes of authority are stable features in the otherwise dynamic story of modernizing change. In essence, the argument was that the historical and early modern stages of socio-cultural evolution were characterized by simultaneous struggles about the nature of god and the nature of man's contingency on man. Thereby two contrasting legitimacy codes of authority developed in such general a fashion as to persist to the modern stage and, indeed, encompassing the four types into which all modern polities could be classified.

One of these, called the ex toto code, involves the postulate that greater reality pertains to society as a whole than its constituent parts. Here legitimate authority demands the symbolic divestment of periphery or constituent parts identities of all those who partake of center goal setting. Another, labelled the ex parte code, signals the premise that greater reality pertains to the constituent parts of society and "society as a whole" is merely a negotiated order. In that case legitimate authority demands the retention of symbols of periphery identities on the part of all those who partake of goal setting at the political center. Furthermore, both of these types of legitimacy codes could be found in all modern polities. But what gives distinctiveness to polities, when viewed in comparative perspective, is that one of these two codes has "primacy" in the sense that TALCOTT PARSONS uses the notion of primacy in patterns of values or system function. I argued that primacy of one such code serves as one mechanism of continuity and enhancement of societal identity; that this function operates through political process; and that such codes should display cross societal invariance since the mentioned stages of development.

This effort not only seeks to improve contemporary modernization theory so that one can account better for known facts such as the persistence of variety in the polities of modern societies, it also aims at theoretical advance in a spirit of continuity with the classics. In the area of politics such effort must therefore address DURKHEIM's (1890–1900) theme that growth in the centralization of power is associated with growth in individualism.

* This paper and its companion piece published in this journal before are revisions of a paper delivered at the University of Pittsburgh Conference on Authority and Identity, April, 1975. Appreciation for helpful suggestions received goes to the participants of the conference and also to V. Lidz and S.N. Eisenstadt.
of psychic structure. Thus if it be useful to argue for at least two contrasting conceptions of legitimate authority, both equally modern, it should also be necessary to show that there is more than one form of modern individualism. My endeavour here is to complete the argument in this respect, showing that there are at least two types of modern individualism, and demonstrating that the relation between individuality and authority makes for persistence rather than change. In short, I argue for two objects of invariance: legitimacy codes of authority and forms of individualism. The relation between the two can be analyzed in two keys, one of "maximum adaptive fit" which eventuates in mutual support; another of "mutual neutralization", where neither the drive for enhanced personal autonomy nor the trend towards greater bureaucratization undermines the operation of the other. And it is the relation in these two forms which permits the two objects of invariance to persist operating as symbolic structures that confer identity to society. Modernizing change in this area pertains not to alteration of the symbols but to better implementation of their patterns throughout society, making all authority relations more coherent with each other.

Developed in five parts, the first presents some theoretically suggestive facts from the literature of socialization in cross-national perspective. The second utilizes these facts to develop two types of individualism, displaying parallels in modern psychic structure on the one hand and modern authority relations structure, on the other. The third section analyzes the relation between authority and individuality as a cause for invariance in both. Section four presents a summary of the invariance hypothesis of the two essays. And the conclusion illustrates growth in coherence of authority relations by examining the spread of nation-specific legitimacy codes into the economy, on the one hand, and the modern medical complex, on the other.

I
On Types of Individualism

Dealing with societies at the same level of complexity in organization demands attention to common as well as variant features as regards forms of individualism. Starting with the common elements, even "primitive" and "archaic" man was a Median actor capable of some reflection as regards "self", "other", and "world" as separate objects with potentially problematical relations. In that sense, individualism is treated as a transhistorical cross-cultural universal in the social sciences (SCHLOTTMANN 1968). However, with the low level of differentiation at these first two stages of evolution, a structured demand for such reflection hardly existed. Just such a demand arose, instead, with the emergence of a sense of "personal self" above and beyond all social identities and the idea of personal responsibility concerning all conduct vis à vis a monotheistically concentrated source of ultimate meaning during the historical and early modern stages (BELLAH 1964: 336–370). The result was DURKHEIM's "cult of the individual". Minimally, this covers two things. One is having a sense of identity, a cross-situationally and transtemporally stable sense of self beyond all role entanglements. Another concerns a sense of freedom of choice in investing that self more into one role or set of roles than into others, at any given stage and over one's life-course as a whole, coupled with the burden of personal responsibility for such choice.

The individualism at issue, then, may be described as an institutionalized and internalized capacity of the "personal self" for partial self-direction in multiple environments. These cover the internal action environments of culture, society, and behavioral organism and the "non-action environments" of nature, and "the problem of ultimate meaning" (PARSONS 1966: 5–29; 1971: 4–28). This Parsonian interpretation of DURKHEIM's cult of the individual as an evolutionary universal needs amendment in but one respect, treated below, which calls for adding history as an important partial environment of action to the others just enumerated.

At this point the idea of partial self-direction needs emphasis. Modern action systems are so complex that they require a balance of inner and outer controls regarding individuals. Neither socialization, enculturation, nor direct social control could conceivably suffice for a social structure with built-in fluidity and change. To this point one can follow SCHLOTTMANN (1968). But his conceptualization of individualism as an additional mechanism of integration opera-
tive through "personalization" and his insistence that it occurs only in cases where the value-system is distinctly "individualist", stressing in fact a kind of individualist utilitarianism as a priority commitment (SCHLOTTMANN 1968: 65, 110ff), remains inadequate in that it overemphasizes the need for inner and underemphasizes the need for outer controls (MILLER & SWANSON 1960).

However limited the empirical base, problematic the analytical distinction (WILSON 1974: 21–30), and improbable the finding of the centrality of "shame" in high civilization cases (EBERHARD 1967), the earlier literature on "shame" and "guilt cultures" (PIER & SINGER 1953) proves more instructive for the modern case. Modern individualism must be based on both: outer and inner control, in balanced form. A sensitive gyroscope to pick up orienting cues from a fluidly and complexly organized environment is needed just as much as a conscience structured with commitments to highly abstract evaluative standards.

Neither the predominance of one or the other will do as some literature suggested (RIESMAN & GLAZER 1952). The reason is simple, Modernity is organized complexity. Standards of evaluation must be abstract; they cannot involve detail prescriptions of conduct in concrete situations. Persons must be committed to such abstract standards, such that detail specification of integr-ous situational meanings can be entrusted to them. But they must also be sensitive to the opinion of others, such that personalized implementation remains sufficiently supplied with informational variety to constitute responsible implementation that can be justified vis à vis others in case of demand.

History must be added as a relevant partial environment to action since the historical and early modern stages. This is so because developments during these stages incorporated historical consciousness, and with that history itself, into the organized complexity that systems of action have come to be since. The development of religious symbolization to the monotheistic level also generalized societal values to the point where they came to constitute the identity of a society. Already at that stage the state became the value-implementive agency of society. Onto this back- ground of a societal identity and an agency responsible for its preservation, the Reformation-stage added the imperative of action to revise society in line with cultural ideals. In principle, this turned the state into an actor legitimized in terms of contributing to the perfection of society (BAUM 1975). Ever since, demands for social change have historical roots at least in part.

Change in society follows patterns of perceived historical imperfections, and their correction legitimizes mobilization for change no matter what other ideals may be involved. Further, mobilization for change in society cannot entirely disregard the perennial problem of mobilization for defense of society. This has been another inevitable consequence of the attainment of societal identity. Thus, whether it is for internal development and change or for external defense, societies have come to rely in their political process on as much uncontested history as they can in order to mobilize the largest possible quantum of political support for the realization of national goals. The term uncontested history points out that history is but a partial environment to action. Being subject to revision in regard to the meaning of facts but protected from rampant revisionism through some variable respect for scientifically established facts, history constitutes but a partially manipulable resource for the steering of conduct in the present.

Next, given the institutionalization of a "revisable self" in conjunction with that of a "revisable society" (BELLAH 1964), increased historical consciousness can be postulated as operative in the private lives of individuals as well. A first consideration here is the ubiquitous fact of man's extreme infancy dependency on caretaker roles. No one can ever escape wholly from his social and biological parentage. A second cause of increased historical consciousness on the personal plane — who one was, is and will be — results from simultaneous membership in the "erotic association" that is the modern nuclear family, on the one hand, and that other differentiation-product of the household-economy, the bureaucratized occupational complex, on the other (SMELSER 1959; PARSONS 1968b: 16). For such simultaneous membership requires participation in normative systems antithetical in content as well as personal assumption of responsibility for the implementation of different norms, notably those with long term interests, such as formal organizations, as well as the contrary short term interests of family and self. Finally third, whatever the range of variation among industrial societies in actual amounts and types of social
mobility as well as normative orientations to it (FOX & MILLER 1966), increased consciousness about social mobility also constitutes an evolutionary universal. This emphasizes to everyone his stratum origin and moving through a life-course. Hopefully, these considerations suffice to assert that modern individualism must cope with contingency on history both publicly and privately, collectively and individually. So much for the common elements.

Turning to variant features, a first difference between forms of individualism derives directly from the "deep contrast" in the image of society associated with the two authority codes. Under the ex parte code, society is never more than an order negotiated from its constituent parts which in turn have greater "reality". Where the ex toto code prevails, "society as a whole" has deeper, because immanent, reality than its constituent parts, which in turn derive their "lesser reality" in secondary fashion only by assuming a role in a functional division of labor. If one assumes that the question of immanence, in both its outcomes of affirmation and negation, applies to the image of society and that of personality (SWANSON 1967; BELLAH 1964), a first difference between variant forms of individualisms emerges.

The idea of "immanence of soul is most likely to appear . . ., if a man's personality cannot be readily construed as acquired through his importation of the purposes, traditions, and attitudes of groups to which he belongs" (SWANSON 1967: 23). According to SWANSON's work, such a conception of personal self as resting on sources other than one's immediate associates was associated with authority relations legitimized in terms that I have called the ex toto code. That is why I should like to label it ex toto individualism. A first contrasting type can then be postulated by describing the opposite. Accordingly, where a personal sense of self is seen as a product of a biography of group affiliations throughout one's life, one constitutes an "I" out of past encounters with a series of "Thous". Analogously, this form might be called ex parte individualism. Now to some details concerning the difference.

A sense of personal identity compatible with an ex toto code demands that one seek the source of one's uniqueness outside the members of one's immediate group affiliations and use these near-others as contrast-resources to constantly separate "personal" and "social" selves. Individualism under an ex toto code involves a more direct relation between the individual and cultural standards. To be sure, that relation must be mediated, but one uses "specialist" roles for that mediation rather than MEAD's "generalized other". Since immanence connotes a given essence, the focal points of a sense of personal self are ideals rather than concrete others and their practice. Such ideals, furthermore, are not chosen as one chooses the parts of a menu but are, in however incoherent a form, givens to which one must yield. The sense of personal identity is realized in some kind of struggle over what one must be and must do, not ever just over what one wants. The ex toto individualist gets a sense of personal self through conforming to the demands of group affiliations to the hilt of his capacity, while at the same time upholding a near-ideological commitment to the idea of never becoming what he does as a mere social actor. In the extreme case, he knows that he is not just the sum total of his social identities because he can do perfectly — in terms of fulfilling his social obligations — what he himself does not want to do at all. While the ideal-typical opposite of a deceiving con-man, ex toto individualism succeeds by playing nothing but roles in quite a conscious fashion yet manages never to think of a personalized self as a role player at all. The best short formula to describe this type might be to say that ex toto individualism amounts to being a sociopath without being a deviant. As McCLELLAND (1964: 80) put it for his ideal-typical German: "Paradoxically it is the very sacrifice of one's personal interests, feelings, and pleasures that one gets a sense of individuality . . ." After all, how can one have a sense of personal self if that, at any given moment in time, were no more than the internalization of one's concrete affiliational ties? How can there be a sense of personal self, so the logic of ex toto individualism, if one is never more than a program of societal identities?

But what the ex toto individualist abhors, as slaving conformity at any given moment of time, is precisely what the ex parte individualist uses to gain a sense of personalized self over time. His mode of realizing a revisable self takes the form of a sequential movement through a series of
group affiliations, each one of which he takes as sources of deep identification. His success as an individualist derives from his ability for deep yet temporary identification. Given the notion that "no social order is possible except that based on the desires of its members" (McClelland 1964: 73), what he wants becomes the focal point of the universe in which he seeks to gain a personal sense of self. Consequently, his is a kind of tenuous "group-individualism" by which he genuinely feels, thinks, and acts in line with those of his associates without, however, this leading to a sense of permanent obligation to others. Exit parte individualism is also extremely voluntaristic. As McClelland put it for his ideal-typical American, he acts according to the formula "I want to freely choose to do well what others expect me to do" (McClelland 1964: 72). This type can really believe in the particularist group perspectives with which he is engaged, but then also leave them behind if an opportunity arises, join another group and take on another set of perspectives. He is convinced in his heart that organizations are in essence never more than associations formed for the mutual advancement of individual goals. The best short formula to describe this type may be that ex parte individualism amounts to group-conformism without a belief in any sui generis reality of groups.

In sum, these types of individualisms involve a reversal between the patterning of symbols concerning the greater or lesser reality of the individual or his groups and the behavioral strategies adopted to generate a sense of personal self. Exit parte individualism assigns greater reality to individuals and relegates groups to a piece of negotiated social order. But when it comes to implementing that symbolic order, a sense of personal identity is achieved through temporary deep identifications with groups and voluntaristic change of group affiliations through the lifetime. Ex toto individualism assigns greater reality to the group and lesser to the individual. But here a sense of personal identity above all social ones is realized through perfection of role-conformity without any deep identification of mere social demands but a very deep identifications with permanent cultural ideals instead. The ex parte path of individuation involves a change through time of being, successively, different kinds of "average man"; the ex toto path rests on a self-conscious concerned avoidance of ever being an average man by adherence to explicit cultural ideals serving as the central resource for generating a sense of unique self on the one hand, and on formalized role-conformity as an instrumental concession for the achievement of personal identity on the other.

Turning to empirical evidence, how groups can come to constitute a greater and externally given reality confronting the "weak" individual clearly shows up in comparing socialization practices in Russia, France, and the United States. Soviet children display less "anti-social" behavior in general than American children. Furthermore, among Russians, peer-control exerts as much "sociality" as adult-control which it does not among Americans (Bronfenbrenner 1970: 78). Thus, when it comes to behavior, institutionalized collectivism in Russia is more continuous across the generational barrier. Also, Soviet kids strike the American observer as so well behaved and "strongly motivated to learn as to display a definite idealistic orientation to life" (Bronfenbrenner 1970: 77). But when one examines conformity to overt external behavior demands as contrasted with internalization of social standards such as telling the truth, it

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1 The above used empirical evidence concerning these two types of individualism from German and American data for the ex toto and ex parte versions, respectively. Since these sources as well as others from the Soviet Union and France will be drawn on further, a brief methodological comment is in order. First, any adequate empirical testing concerning the question whether the two crucial evolutionary stages brought about the simultaneous adoption of authority codes and individualisms with invariance in both thereafter is quite beyond the resources available for this exploratory essay. Consequently, the use of empirical evidence here is restricted to shoring up trust in the plausibility of the hypothesis, inviting its testing, rather than doing the test. Secondly, the reader should be aware that my companion piece on authority codes did not specify a tight "fit" between legitimacy code and type of regime, such as democracy or authoritarianism. The relation pertains instead to the degree of coherence. The more internally coherent the authority relations in a society with a democratic regime, the more will authority be legitimized with ex parte rituals, for example. The same applies to the relation between types of individualism and of authority legitimation patterns. It is a matter of relative fit, not one of a one-to-one correspondence. The fact that French data testify to ex toto individualism, while France is a democracy, does not, therefore, invalidate the hypothesis of relative fit.
turns out that Soviet kids stress far more the former and significantly less the latter than do children from such countries as Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States (BRONFENBRENNER 1970: 81). Thus, one can observe the essential bifurcation among *ex parte* and *ex toto* identity formation already among twelve-year olds. The former seeks consistency between outer constraint and inner reality and finds a secure sense of self in being an average kid. The latter, however, can already conform without "becoming" what he adheres to by balancing outer control and inner experience through identification with ideal standards and selective dependency on their bearers and representatives in society. The key element in this early bifurcation seems to be the profound difference between the conception concerning the very nature of personality and the socialization ideals and practices following from it.

It is a basic assumption of Soviet personality psychology to view man as developing "in the collective, through the collective, for the collective" (BRONFENBRENNER 1962: 83). When it comes to socialization ideals and practices, the Russian approach hinges everything on the natural postulation of a supraordinate goal shared alike by both parties across the socializer-socialize gap. American practice far more resembles confrontation across this gap with different commonalities shared separately on each side which have to be laboriously articulated with each other. In the Soviet Union, family authority is one essentially delegated from the state to the parents, and parental duties constitute but an instance of the essentially similar obligation to society exacted from all throughout life (BRONFENBRENNER 1962: 72). Under this symbolic umbrella, man is and can never be more than a part of society. Where a postulated supraordinate goal asserts symbolic sameness between parent and child, resources for generating a distinct sense of self must necessarily be located outside the direct relationship itself. Where the American can choose a near-generalized other, viz. an age cohort member, to find distinctiveness of the group-contrast variety *vis à vis* parents, no identical opportunity exists for the child in Russia. But one has to add the extraordinary stress on self-discipline, and its apparent effectiveness in conformity to overt behavior demands in Russia, to see that the search for a "personal self outside society" is not only motivationally necessary but also socially possible. Persons can become predictable social actors through a deep introjection of ideal standards coupled with a primarily cognitive and almost instrumental attention to the opinion of generalized others. Then the interests of society are satisfied and details concerning commitment to articles of faith remain a matter of relative indifference to the immediate social environment of persons.

If the essence of corporatist politics — the advancement of collective over individual benefits — rests squarely on the institutionalization of a person’s social stratum membership as *the effective social identity*, as ROGOWSKI and WASSER-SPRING (1973) have persuasively argued, a classic cultural locus of *ex toto* individualism should be the caste order of India. Not surprisingly, one finds there that Hindu dharma constituted a religiously sanctioned set of social imperatives to observe the rights and obligations of one’s station but not any pronounced concern with the social enforcement of the individual’s commitment to doctrinal details of religious belief. So long as a person does not violate the social conventions of caste, “he may think as he pleases” (PARSONS 1937: 557). Indeed WEBER (1916—1917: 148) stressed complete inner detachment from outer conformity as a central characteristic of personalized salvational striving in that case.

A culture which, for whatever reasons, develops value stances to sheer excess can be truly revealing if a comparative perspective prevents one from taking evidence at face value. In this spirit, Spanish personalism illustrates *ex toto* individualism very well. Here the deep identification with abstract ideals coupled with an automatized social-expectational conformity has been so individuated, hence personalized regarding inner introjects, that belief frequently fails to function as a guide to shared commitments and action altogether. Instead one encounters compulsive rebelliousness, a repugnance toward social discipline, and the idea that non-submission to law constitutes the ultimate and noble expression of man’s freedom. Life is “a shout” about the personally achieved integrate of inner commitment and outer events. It is obedience to values believed to have been selected from alternatives by individual choice coupled with instrumental acceptance of constraints from others by sheer necessity and almost devoid of ethical significance (CASTRO 1954: 281, 608,
619–628). Yet despite the inbuilt tendency to excess in this case, the deep bifurcation of inner experience and outer constraint has apparently made the Spaniard a natural sophisticate concerning self-consciousness about the inevitable selectivity attendant on any commitment to a given value-system. For it is said of the Spanish that “contrary to primitive man, the Spaniard always realized the high price paid for being a Spaniard” (CASTRO 1954: 614). Self-consciousness about the nature of one’s commitment and how one must be separate and different from others constitutes one central distinguishing mark between ex toto and ex parte individualism.

Other differences emerge from socialization data of France, Germany, and the United States. First, as in Russia and unlike the United States, one meets again the ability of ex toto individuals in France to conform outwardly without anything like the introjection of social standards necessary for the ex parte individual. At least differential parental behavior reflects it as an operative assumption. As in Russia, where “social control is focused not on sentiment but behavior... so that (a person) would do what was expected of him regardless of his feelings” (INEKLES & BAUER 1959: 282, emphases in original), the French father limits the exercise of this authority to the control of the children’s behavior but refrains from extending it to their ideas and feelings (WYLIE 1963). Again one encounters the ex toto paradigmatic theme of “stressless compartmentalization” which contrasts so starkly with American adult organizational behavior (CROZIER 1964; BLAUP 1956, 1964) as a difference in relating obligation to self and to society already learned in childhood.

Ex toto individualism implies constraint of outer behavior, freedom of inner experience; while ex parte individualism insists on consistency between outer and inner reality but permits freedom of choice where and with whom to seek it. As WYLIE (1963: 246) put it:

The French child learns that life has been compartmentalized by man and that the limits of each compartment must be recognized and respected. The American child learns that life is a boundless experience. The Frenchman recognizes that rules are a convenience, but that they are man-made and therefore artificial. The American believes he has discovered his rules for himself and that they reflect the essential structure of reality. For the Frenchman, reality is dual; there is the official reality of man-made rules, but it is only a facade concealing a deeper, more mysteri-

ous reality which may be felt by the individual in moments of introspection or revealed by art or religion. For the American, reality is a unity, and any apparent discrepancy between the ideal and the actuality is essentially immoral.

Not surprisingly, that contrast governs the experience of adolescence as well. For the French and the German, there is no need to discover that life is run according to a double-standard; that is already known. The problem is to find one’s own position towards that inevitable natural fact. There is here a tendency to “escape into oneself”, dwell in one’s private domain of thought, feeling, and “meaning”, even though one common emotion may be hatred for the les autres, those others who, not Menschen but mere Leute, force one to conform. But so long as the adolescents’ reaction is confined to emotions or verbal or artistic expression, the others do not care, “society imposes no sanction”. But the American identity-diffusion stage faces a different dilemma. With a unitary reality conception, one must strive to realize what one has been taught to believe one discovered for oneself. And while everyone proclaims the existence of a real code, no one seems to know exactly what it is. The older generation simply places the onus of finding a more acceptable gab between the ideal and the real on youth (WYLIE 1963: 250–251).

Just as the American adult response to the anxiety of illness is to seek security in “average man”, assuring oneself that one is like everyone else, for “the average is normal, correct, accepted, safe, and secure” (ZBOROWSKI 1969: 74), so the adolescent response is to “extend” himself into others in the same condition, his peers, and there find himself. But adolescence under the ex toto code is a reaching-out for explicit cultural orders that mere Leute cannot grasp, with the gratifying consequence that their opinions become irrelevant insofar as fashioning one’s own stance is concerned. Furthermore, the matter does not stop with adolescence. Of the adult in Spain, it is reported that he lives “fixedly oriented to church and state” but remaining “shut up in himself” in spite of living in the main “to express himself” (CASTRO 1954: 126).

While German high school boys (another ex toto case) show a greater concern over obligations to “an idealistic, explicit code of decency and propriety”, American high school boys display great-
er sensitivity to the opinions of others without a corresponding expectation to be given reasons concerning social expectations because they live more in accordance with implicit rules (McClelland 1964: 70–71). While “obligation to society” in Germany—as in Russia (Bronfenbrenner 1970: 100; Bauer 1955: 142–143), and France (Pitts 1961: 704: where the stress on measure is focused on the breach of public order “more so than the motivational state of the actor”)—involves self-discipline, “proudly controlling one’s selfish interests to fulfill one’s explicit duties to the whole of society”, Americans do that by “achieving in conformity with group expectations”; and here the very idea of a “whole” recedes from the significant emotional horizon because here “no social order is possible except that based on the desires of its members” (McClelland 1964: 72–73).

The contrast between a dual conception of reality and a unitary one is also reflected in educational ideas and student behavior, particularly at the secondary level of schooling which demands more impersonal relations than the primary school and the family. American educational philosophy emphasizes the unitary conception of reality in its stress on the development of all the individual’s potentialities for action, which means for use in society. German education “tried to combine humanistic and technical interests and so to reconcile the ideals of the cultivated man with the culturally more transcendent and qualitatively emptier ideal of the competent specialist” (Naegle 1963: 51). Authority relations in French secondary education also reflect the dual conception of reality typical in ex toto individualism. They may serve as a final illustration.

In France authority relations in the school are characterized by two syndromes. There is an “authority syndrome” when youth is compliant, non-participative with, and acceptant of the teacher’s authority. Instruction is accepted “indifferently”, i.e., with low cathetic involvement. But there is also the chahute, a pattern of rebellion and defiance directed at teachers who lack influence because they are either considered incompetent by students or teach what are regarded as unimportant subjects, or both (Schonfeld 1971). Yet chahute has more apparent than real resemblance with the American peer-group and its anti-social characteristics as described by Bronfenbrenner (1970) because the French is a kind of “instant” delinquent community, lacking in both stability of informal group structure and leadership. No doubt, the chahute is a powerful mechanism to vent aggression against social targets. It seems to operate as a learning mechanism on which the process of ex toto individuation relies in achieving its product: the ability to rely for one’s sense of personal self on self-selected cultural ideals. That demands strength, living without the crutch of seeking assurance in other. Seen in the perspective of the “double existence” of accepting authority without involvement from sone and “chahuting” against others, the pattern suggests a mode of acquiring ego strength of the kind where a person can do what “reality” insists on without identifying himself with the exacted behavior in any deep way. That way, one may become a “social authoritarian” without becoming an “authoritarian personality”. And this is indeed necessary if one is to behave successfully in French bureaucracy. For the authority relations of that context rely on alternation between long periods of “rule by rigid procedure” which means not ever being “a subject” of any person, and short periods of direct “military-like” rule, obtaining when the rules of procedure demand re-writing in the service of the organization’s adjustment to change in environments (Crozier 1964).

For ease of overview, Table I summarizes the differences between ex toto and ex parte individualisms.

Since McClelland (1964) was so successful in describing the special strength and weakness associated necessarily with the organization of any set of rules, it may be useful to close this section by a brief enumeration of the typical weaknesses associated with each form of individualism. Thus, driven to excess, taking responsibility vis à vis culture under the ex toto form implies a compartmentalization of life where Bellah’s (1967) civil religion could not operate at all. And there is empirical evidence. Spain’s personalism is so extreme that a society-wide civil religion does not exist (Castro 1954: 127). The same was true of Germany’s excess under the Nazis (Schoenbaum 1966). Under such conditions the right of the individual to construct his own meaning universe has been carried to a point where society-wide appeals to public morals are rejected as sheer
| Obligation to: | EX TOTO  
|              | Individualism | EX PARTE  
|              | Individualism |
| CULTURE     | Given the dual structure of reality with greater reality of "whole" than "parts", deep identification with abstract ideals constitutes the primary material of a sense of self, maintenance of commitment to culture-standards, the main mode of continuity in a sense of self | Given the unitary nature of reality with the primacy of "parts" over mere "negotiated wholes", deep but temporary identifications with a changing set of generalized others constitute the content of the self, maintenance of the ability to leave and rejoin others, the main mode of continuity in a sense of self |
| SOCIETY     | Loyalty to formalized, functionally differentiated, explicit codes op proper behavior | Fidelity to a negotiated order, its negotiability, and revisability through other-directedness |
| SELF        | Individual self-direction, maintenance of self-discipline over impulses, and self-actualization through the exercise of will power that channels selected skills in a fixed direction | Self-actualization of all potentials for action through serilization over the life-course, and letting utility to others be the criterion as to what has been realized |
| HISTORY     | Loyalty to one's culture of birth, its historical roots and present stage of development in its particularisms, i.e., commitment to historical responsibility where the present is a constraint of the past and a selected future | Commitment to an open, more universalistic future of mankind constrained but by the most general features of the history of one's culture of birth |

* This is clearly an attempt to generalize from McCLELLAND's (1964: 78) comparative work on value formals of two societies to types of individualisms characteristic of two types of industrial society.

stupid sentimentality. On the ex parte side the corresponding excess is the moralization of everything and therefore of essentially nothing. As to excess in obligations to society the ex tuto formula tends to eventuate into MERTON's ritualism, empty conformism with the detail demands of society in blithe disregard of the larger aims involved. The corresponding ex parte excess involves distorting demand for reform into a spiral of "change for the sake of change" which substitutes novelty per se for any genuine improvement. As regards the responsibility for the self, ex parte excess amounts to beatnikism and rampant license while arrogance, pride, and personality rigidity characterize the ex tuto case (McCLELLAND 1964: 78). Finally, with respect to history, excess under the ex tuto category means particularist chauvinism whether on ethnic or national lines; while the ex parte variety, when driven to excess, displays a mixture of historylessness coupled with the most parochial and uninformed convictions concerning the alleged universal nature of man.

This evidence suffices to take a first step beyond the single model of modern individualism as given with Inkeles-man (INKELES & SMITH 1974). Before exploiting it for the development of two types of modern psychic structure, however, a brief summary of the essential characteristics of both types of individualism is in order.

First, regardless of its type, modern individualism demands a balance of inner and outer controls of behavior. It does not permit a relative primacy of one over the other. But second, achieving such a balance permits, nevertheless, of at least two profoundly different modes. These involve type-specific conceptions of the structure of reality as regards the individual-group contingencies and type-specific uses of time to achieve a sense of personal autonomy and freedom.

Ex tuto individualism relies on a dual conception of the structure of reality characterized by stressless compartmentalization. There is deep identification with abstract cultural ideals and a primarily cognitive, instrumental, adjutative orientation to the constraints of social reality. A sense of uniqueness is achieved through expressive behavior at any given moment in time, a sense of membership-identity is attained through expectational conformity over time. Inner experience and outer constraint are articulated by letting the latter serve as a security base for the courage required.
to live cost-consciously with a given set of value-commitments.

On the other hand, *ex parte* individualism relies on a unitary conception of the structure of reality in which all compartmentalization remains stressful being subject to reduction by effort. There is deep identification with the opinion of generalized others and their moral elaboration into a shared universe of commitments at any given moment in time. This is coupled with an extraordinary ability to move into new social situations, both geographically and vertically as regards stratification, and find oneself deeply motivated to forge bonds anew. A sense of membership-identity is achieved at any moment in time, while a sense of uniqueness is attained only over time. It results from the conviction of having exercised choice in the selection of changing affiliates where even nuances of differences in life-style encountered and made real for oneself attain significance for having achieved what one is. Less compartmentalized to begin with, inner experience and outer constraint are articulated over a whole life-course guided by a relatively cost-unconscious commitment to values.

II

Modern Individualisms and Personality Structure

The above makes it apparent that balancing inner experience and outer constraint in the *ex toto* case involves a primary reliance on the ego-ideal and the ego. The former provides the pattern of what one must be and/or become; the latter supplies a reality check as well as protection against the potentially polluting impact from mere others on the self.

But the conception of a unitary structure of reality between individual and group, coupled with a moralization of identifications with shifting others distinctive of *ex parte* individualism, points to the fact that this type of balancing inner experience and outer constraint relies particularly on the super-ego and id structures of personality. This is possible when the latter is conceived as a generalized energy reservoir, a differentiation-product of FREUD's original id with its bipolar structure of libido and destructive as in HARTMANN's (1945-49) reformulation. Then it becomes at least probable that the *ex parte* individual's amazing capacity to be motivated to forge new affiliations again and again rests on a super-ego "guided" mobilization of generalized cathexes in the libidinal key. For he who must rely on generalized other, when it comes to who he is, must also be capable to endow those others with special positive significance for his own security. "Encoding" of generalized energy with libido through the super-ego probably constitutes the most significant "enabling mechanism" in this particular form of self-realization.

This formulation uses PARSONS' (1968b) four-function reconceptualization of FREUD's original structural triad. Accordingly, all four functional components are conceived as differentiation products of an originally undifferentiated mental life. So differentiated, id specializes for adaptive functions, ego for goal-attainment functions, super-ego for integration, and ego-ideal for pattern-maintenance and tension-management functions. Whether that is a formulation consistent with critical clinical facts must remain an open question here. But connecting the types of individualisms with a differential reliance on either of the two functions placed diagonally in the usual four-function box does serve one useful purpose. It places the emphasis on tensions thus making the formulation somewhat more consistent with FREUD's persistent stress on ambivalence than PARSONS' (1968b) own first outline managed to do. With the particular kind of id concept already mentioned, this calls for one clarifying comment on the super-ego. FREUD conceived of it as "peopled" with the lost objects of one's parents. But this is too restrictive. Life under the imperative of "a revisable self" makes of personality growth too a life-long genetic process (ERIKSON 1963: 247-274). Consequently, parents as lost objects could not conceivably exhaust the supply of relevant introjects of the super-ego (PARSONS 1968b: 19); instead, the super-ego must be in continuous receipt of relevant figures.

The possibility to identify types of individualism with a differential reliance on familiar psychic structures shows a gratifying parallel with the way it proved feasible to functionally locate the authority codes (cf. BAUM 1977). Again the balancing of inner and outer imperatives is stressed. And again it must be stressed that all four functions
need tending. So, a primary reliance of two functions and a secondary exploitation of the remaining two is all that is claimed; it cannot be a question of exclusive reliance on any two. Once again, as in the case of authority codes, the particular functional use that render distinctiveness to the two types of individualisms involve antinomious functions. *Ex toto* individualism with its preferential reliance on ego-ideal and ego articulates internal-instrumental with external-consummatory functions. Thus, oscillation across this diagonal assures tending to all four functional requisites. The same is true in the *ex parte* case with its differential reliance on id and super-ego which articulates external-instrumental with internal-consummatory needs. Oscillation across the diagonals assures stability in the preferential reliance on functions involved by virtue of the fact that all four requisites are being touched upon. These features are shown in Figure 1 which invites one to view the types of individualisms distilled as compatible with the authority codes by virtue of parallel organization in psychic and socio-political structure (cf. BAUM 1977, Figure 2).

**FIGURE 1** Secondary Individualism and Its Placement in Personality

![Diagram](image)

Figure 1 suggests that what gives individualisms their culturally distinctive mark is the primary articulation of a given antimony. *Ex parte* individualism does this by a mode of self-actualization involving the fullest exploitation of skill potentials (id) controlled through a consecutive serialization of introjecting "generalized other" throughout the life-course (super-ego). When it comes to paths of self-actualization, and only when it comes to that, ego-ideal and ego play a secondary, if very significant, role. In the *ex toto* case the reverse obtains. Self-actualization relies predominantly on a self-selected developmental ego-ideal taken from cultural ideals; and this is controlled by ego-functions in which adjustment skills to societal demands substitute for the need to rely on generalized other as a guidance mechanism. And in this primary mode of self-actualization id and super-ego play a secondary, though indispensable, role.

III

**On Authority-Identity Relations: Causes for Invariance**

The question of the compatibility between authority codes and their respective forms of individualism involves three separate issues. The first concerns the nature of citizenship in modern society; a second has to do with the problem of intra-national empirical variation in codes and individualisms; and a third concerns the invariance hypothesis in terms of the interaction of authority codes and individualisms.

First, the formulations concerning individualism above have been premised on the universality of active citizenship in the modern world, while that was, for the most part, confined to elites in pre-industrial societies of the early modern and historical varieties. Though there may well be profound empirical variations along class, ethnic, and regional lines, drawing some sectors of the population more into the political process than others, the normative ideal of active citizenship for adults has become a fact in all industrial societies. In the Anglo-Saxon and other Western democracies this has taken, in the main, a stress on the individual's right to participate. In the Soviet Union one encounters formulations stressing a "feeling of duty" as a result of social motives like love of the fatherland, devotion to the party, and the like. This doctrine is a rationale for subordinating individual interests to that of the state and for making man "personally responsible for serving the interests of Soviet power" (BAUER 1955: 141), so the foreign observer of Russian educational psychology. Whatever the empirical
adequacy of formulating service to the state just that sharply, for us the important reference is to personal responsibility for society. That is an institutionalized aspect of political modernity everywhere.

Secondly, since invariance in authority codes depends in large measure on the fact that society has also institutionalized the "matching" form of individualism, change due to such events as conquest or peaceful cross-national merger aside, the empirical history of state and nation-formation remains a critical factor as regards intra-national empirical variation in both objects of invariance. There may well be, in any given empirical case, considerable accumulations of opposing conceptions as regards the meaning of legitimate authority and the modes of achieving a sense of personal autonomy. While this matter cannot be examined here, one might leave the issue with venturing an analytically informed guess concerning such empirical variations. By and large, the longer the time elapsed since state-formation and nation-building, which in practically all non-colonial societies followed the former rather than coinciding with it in time, the more likely it is that the respective patterns among the state and nation-building elites gradually become the property of the mass of the population. Not the least important factor in this trickling down of the patterns that were crowned with success in fashioning the modern state is surely education, universally financed from public resources subject to political mobilization.

Finally, while cases of conquest have been excluded from the invariance hypothesis above and before (BAUM 1977), perhaps the most critical evidence supporting the invariance thesis emerges from such cases, though involving an additional variable. GURR (1974: 1491) demonstrated that coherence in authority relations within the polity was positively related to persistence of the polity through time, and one indicator of persistence was a return to the pattern of authority relations extant prior to conquest. On the side of individualisms, and their empirical variations in a given case of society, the parallel of coherence in authority patterns is variety in religious beliefs in the population as a resultant of the idiosyncrasies of state-formation. Empirical variations in these two keys aside, one may, therefore, postulate invariance in both, legitimacy codes of authority and forms of individualisms, because both emerged from the religious and political conflicts of the early modern stage in a form of sufficient generality to meet the organizational requirements of modern complex society. However, persistence in these symbolic structures is due to their interrelations as well.

That interrelation is interpretable in basically two ways. One is a kind of HEGEL function. For it, one should emphasize that it is not governmental relations per se but rather engagement with the political aspect of social structure in general that is the issue. Then it is possible to show that, to the extent of their "matching", authority code and individualism, obedience to authority and the quest for personal autonomy can simultaneously function to supply society with the requisite conformity and personality with a sense of autonomy. The other interpretation, and probably the empirically more prevalent one, relies on comaptability between authority and personal identity which neutralizes their potential mutual interference.

"Whereas stability of liberal society is based on the loyalty of citizens . . . the loyalty of the Soviet citizen has been based on the stability of the political system" (INKELES & BAUER 1959: 290). In Russia, collective identification amounts to an institutionalized expectation, internalized in persons, hence also filling deeply felt and widespread personality need-dispositions. As always in the work of ALEX INKELES, this insight is not speculation but based on impressive fact. There was not only an amazing level of system-support and appreciation in this refugee sample, there were also genuine gems of Hegelianisms. A few may suffice for illustration. Respondents demand that government should
look after cultural and even spiritual needs of citizens. In the words of one articulate respondent: “It is not enough (for the government) merely to provide material security, it must secure the person. After all, a person has a soul.” A strong central government is assumed to give the nation direction and purpose. It should be active, may be autocratic, but must not be arbitrary. And when these conditions are met, “the state can do anything. Without a government you cannot exist. On the contrary, when you love the government you will do as it wishes” (INKELES & BAUER 1959: 238, 250). In general, hostility goes to persons — incumbents of leadership positions — not the system. These facts invite generalization to all ex teto authority relations.

It has been stated that the authority codes are distinct by assigning greater and lesser reality to the system as a whole or its constituent parts. In addition, one may suggest, without detail elaborations, that it is in the nature of all activist social systems to institutionalize doubt regarding the adequacy of performance. And no doubt, such institutionalization of doubt must refer to a situation where members can continuously question some exigencies because they take others completely for granted. If it were not for such a mixture of presumed certainty in some and the production of uncertainty in other respects, continuous questioning would spread to everything, eventuating in an anomic state. When it comes to political systems then, it seems likely that institutionalized doubt concerns the “lesser realities”. Where the ex teto authority code prevails, this is the realm of the constituent parts, those collectivities which are assigned identity through the division of labor, and perhaps ultimately persons. Consequently, one might say that ex teto regimes institutionalize personal doubt. Where the ex parte code prevails, on the other hand, the “lesser reality” is assigned to the “whole” rather than the “parts”, i.e. the negotiated common order. Consequently, one might say that ex parte regimes institutionalize system-doubt.

While the matter cannot be documented here, the following may suffice to make this assertion plausible. In Western democracies, particularly those with stable party systems (ROSE & URWIN 1970), the operation of a free and relatively competitive press in pursuit of relevant exciting news seems to be characterized by an inherent tendency to question whether the system really works. Electoral processes, blaming non-performance on problems of consensus construction, and investigative reporting are only a few of the sources making for system-doubt. Excepting samizdat, there are no analogues in the consultative authoritarian regimes of the Communist variety. These are characterized by a controlled press. But while a free press does characterize many corporatist regimes, the remaining ex teto cases, there, the inherent personalism of political leadership, and the very features of praetorian mobilization (HUNTINGTON 1968) which leaves the political structure essentially unchanged, though it may eventuate in enormous change in the economy and the educational system, one finds conditions which make men count in fact while system concerns remain academic.

These different forms of institutionalizing doubt in authority relations systems show maximal adaptive fit with the respective personality needs for security prevalent in the two types of individualisms.

In both cases the typical structural weakness associated with each type of individualism, visible especially when these forms are driven to excess, is one where tending it at the personality level can be done through rendering obedience.

With institutionalized personal doubt characteristic of ex teto authority relations, the identified structural deficit of the political system pertains to the ability of persons to forge effective affiliations. Relative to the other case, what this system needs is persons willing to cooperate. Now, as shown, ex teto individualism encounters rebelliousness and lack of social discipline as the typical structural weakness of personality. There is little doubt as to who one is and must be with respect to a sense of “personal self”; the ego-ideal tends to be strong. There is also little doubt as to what one can afford to be, given prevailing conditions; one also knows with how much one

3 Having relied on INKELES and BAUER (1959) for relevant evidence above, it is necessary to stress that this interpretation departs wholly from theirs which stressed Soviet man’s nagging doubt about the “inner”, trust on “outer self” derived apparently from the older guilt-shame dichotomy which is more concealing than revealing with respect to the relation personality and social structure in modern complex society.
can get away with; the personal subjective ego tends to be strong. But there is often doubt as to one’s social identities. The “self loved by others” and the “self that makes itself” through providing demanded contributions to society remain problematical; the super-ego and HARTMANN’s id constitute the structurally weak parts of personality. When doubt about the latter surpasses critical thresholds, obedience to authority aids in reducing it. This occurs through a transformation of the normally instrumental, if not opportunistic, adjustment to social constraints. In response to a need of certainty as regards one’s social identities, the normally amoral sphere of adjusting to others becomes infused with moral significance. In this fashion, obedience to authority supplies society with expected effectiveness in cooperation and personality with reassurance in social identity. Thus the reason why system stability in the Soviet Union “conditions” citizen loyalty becomes apparent. In a format of effective societal demand, the very capacity of a citizen to be really loyal, rather than just feel loyal, depends first and foremost on assurance and confidence as to who one is socially. Otherwise one cannot even know relevant performance expectations with sufficient certainty. And a stable political system, providing maximal legitimacy to political demands, then enables persons to use obedience to authority for attaining reassurance and confidence on just that aspect of personality structure typically under strain.

With institutionalized system-doubt typical of ex parte authority relations, the identified structural deficit in the polity is consensus construction rather than the capacity of persons to form effective groups. Interest aggregation is in deficit relative to interest articulation. The “system as a whole” tends to need trust as regards its real existence in the minds of constituent parts, ultimately persons. Now, ex parte individualism is characterized by structural strength as regards social identities but structural weakness as regards a secure sense of “personal self”. This is necessarily so where one lives through deep identification with shifting group affiliates at any moment in time but gains security of “personal self” only retroactively over time through a sense of experienced control with respect to having selected significant others. Here HARTMANN’s id and the super-ego constitute the peculiar strengths of personality, ego-ideal and ego the weaker parts.

While the former can be trusted, secured as they are through a constant supply of meaningful associations, the latter remain relatively problematical. In the ego-ideal sector this is particularly true concerning the required certainty as to who one must be and become when time-consciousness about mortality bears down on persons. In the ego sector there remains a nagging doubt as to who one can be, potentially. Given the ease of entry and departure in the area of significant affiliations, groups serve well to assure persons who they are socially at any given moment in time, but they do not constrain persons’ fantasies with respect to potentials. Thus consensus construction, the need of the polity, can exploit personality needs to find assurance who one must be in the ego-ideal sector and who one can be, in the light of death, by reducing surplus complexity in the ego sector. Once again, obedience to authority can supply the political system with its need, which is to find the common denominator, while simultaneously serving personality in search of acceptable limitations as regards an integrus “personal self” realized through ego-controlled contributions to the system as a whole.

But as to such maximal adaptive fit between socio-political and personality needs, there remains one difference between the two cases discussed which makes such fit harder in the ex parte instance. Here, adaptive fit has to operate primarily at the level of national political process engaging national citizenship roles. It may also operate at some lesser scales of inclusiveness such as region, province or state. But the smaller the grouping, the more one approaches that which is in relative surfeit and needs no shoring up: the constituent parts and their affiliational realm. This makes the effective adaptive fit in the ex parte case peculiarly contingent on the existence of a civil religion and its effective use in processes of national political mobilization. There is very little chance for an adaptive fit in competitive democratic regimes which lack a civil religion.

Finally, one can also argue compatibility between types of individualisms and authority codes. In contrast to adaptive fit, compatibility describes a situation where collective processes of social constraint leave the individual free to seek solutions for structured weakness at the personality level on his own, while such search, within limits,
remains neutral in its effect on effective collaboration. This argument can be summarized as follows.

Above it has been recalled that the *ex teto* code demands symbolic divestment of social periphery characteristics among all those who can legitimately participate in center goal setting. It should be obvious that this is something not only easily achieved among *ex teto* individuals whose particularist social identities normally remain somewhat attenuated, but it should be equally evident that for the same reason claims regarding symbolic divestment can be trusted by every man with relative ease. In such societies everyone knows, and indeed occasionally suffers from the fact, that particular social identities are but skin-deep. This is, after all, part of the experience of everyday life when one focuses on authority relations in general rather than merely governmental relations in particular and has available the type of individualism that matches authority. Meeting the requirement of symbolic divestment of particular constituent interests is easy and easily understood among men who have lived a life of concerned avoidance of ever becoming mere social actors. Conversely, the search for a valid subjective sense of self is so imbued with the need for distanciation from "mere people", so oriented to cultural ideals, as to relativize social contingencies to indifference. Focused on factors of cultural rather than social relevance, processes of finding oneself may withdraw cathexes from society, but they remain unlikely to interfere much with society.

*Ex parte* individualism matches up with the requirements of the *ex parte* authority code in a similar way. Since social identities, though changing, are the real and trusted ones for most humdrum everyday conduct, meeting the requirement of the retention of periphery particularist characteristics when it comes to legitimating center goal setting activity in politics is practically guaranteed. For where man is fundamentally seen as a "generalized other" at any given moment in time this other, its label notwithstanding, must be a particular other: a family man, an occupational man, a party man, an ethnic, a class member, or whatever. This seems inevitable where men are seen to be what their group affiliations amount to. And under these conditions, even the adoption of an ideological stance to represent the haunted "whole" can never ring so true as to effectively communicate the total divestment of the interest of groups to which such spokesmen belong. Thus, what is ultimately proscribed for legitimate authority, but demands some limited practice given that all polities need both authority codes, has little chance of being accepted as the way things really are. Meeting the legitimacy requirements of the retention of periphery characteristics is easy and easily understood by men accustomed to trusting their social identities.

In sum, whereas the interpretation of maximum adaptive fit involves mutual reinforcement between authority code and individualism, the compatibility argument describes mutual neutralization between the two. To the extent that the latter obtains, neither of the two pursuits — the quest for personal autonomy and the drive to establish more effective cooperative systems — can interact in a mutually destabilizing fashion. For a perspective that sees in growth of effective cooperation and personal freedom the hallmarks of modernization, this indeed constitutes an important condition for continuity in both: culturally distinct patterns of authority and of individual autonomy.

IV

Summary

The main features of the preceding (BAUM 1977) and the present efforts can be summarized under five points as follows:

1) Evolutionary invariance in codes of authority and conceptions of personal autonomy dates since the "historical" and "early modern" stages of evolution, because these stages identify societies with the following correlated features. Monotheistic religious symbols were involved in the development of culture-area-specific value-systems which raised different elements from a common pool of archaic and primitive value-commitments to the same level of generality. Conceptions of meaningful authority and a "true self" capable of understanding and taking responsibility for obligations to God, society, and self were encoded in different ways. All, however, showed tensions in man's group affilations and the development of a conscience that balanced inner and outer sources of control, though achieving that balance in different ways. A four-class stratification system prevailed composed of social formations with varying degrees of autonomy from each other and center elites. With secular and sacred authority differentiated and
hence in potential tension, exercising authority therefore faced the double problem of articulating the permanent interests of social systems with the transitory interest of mortal men and, given the division of labor achieved, of creating unity of purpose among groups and roles diverse in purpose.

2) Resulting from a simultaneous struggle about the nature of God and the nature of man’s contingency on man, the tensions between secular and sacred authority eventuated in basically two types of very general solutions as regards meaningful authority relations and conceptions of personal autonomy or individualism. In terms of the value-principles involved in these conceptions, though certainly not in terms of their detail implementation in human action, these were so general solutions as to become exempt from further evolutionary change. Such subsequent change was confined to codification and specification of the principles with respect to their meaning in different areas of society’s division of labor.

3) The solutions were as follows: (a) under the ex toto version, authority was premised on the inherent primacy of a societal unity that ultimately ranked above the apparent diversity of groups and their interests; the whole was assigned greater reality than the parts. Corresponding to this was a conception of personal autonomy or the “true self” premised on an assignment of greater reality to permanent universal cultural imperatives and a lesser one to particular group attachments. (b) under the ex parte version the reverse relations obtained. Here authority stressed an “ex pluribus” notion resting on the premise of the greater reality of constituent groups which had to interact and negotiate a common purpose. And corresponding to it there developed a conception of a “true self” as an emergent property of a series of successive group affiliations.

4) The most important reasons for continuity rather than change in these elements of the structure of human action are three. Were obligations to society and self are “matched” there is maximum adaptive fit in the sense that obedience to authority supplied at one and the same time society and personality with precisely those elements in structural deficit in each. Were there is less than a perfect match, or other factors interfere with the individual’s capacity to identify with the political regime of society, there is still compatibility such that neither increasing centralization of authority nor increasing individuation can interfere with each other. Third, and in both instances, matched conceptions of obligation to society and to self function in the maintenance and enhancement of societal identity over time.

5) Nothing in the above asserts that these objects of invariance are secured against any kind of change from any kind of source. They may well change, but if they do, this will be essentially non-evolutionary change which may involve merger of nation states for example. The reason for stressing non-evolutionary change as the only likely one rests on the adequacy of these conceptions of authority and individualism for presently known forms of the complex organization of human action on the one hand, and their function in maintaining societal identity on the other.

V

Modernizing Change in Authority Codes: The Trend Towards Coherence in All Societal Sectors

Perhaps the best way to conclude this effort is to briefly discuss the nature of change since the early modern stage that the invariance hypothesis calls for. Illustrating elaboration, codification in law, and specification through informal mechanisms of the principles involved can serve at the same time to outline how more systematic comparative research may proceed. The general strategy calls for comparisons of processes of authority legitimation in different societies yet within the same sectors of the division of labor. The question is: granted the requisites of a functional authority of a given type, is authority legitimated in line with the premises of the ex parte and the ex toto codes or not?

In the area of industrial relations, the U.S. and the S.U. (Soviet Union), two classical cases of ex parte and ex toto authority codes respectively, show interesting contrasts.

The authority structure of a prototypical U.S. firm was and still is definitely “authoritarian” when compared with the more democratic-participatory authority relations prevailing in community, states, and the national polity. Office incumbency in a firm is based on appointment not on elections. The same is true, by and large, for labor unions. The general answer one used to give to the question: why no democracy in the economy, was simple. Since the purpose of association, the goals of the organization, were typically taken for granted — maximization of secure returns for the parties involved — there was no conflict about ends. And where there was no value conflict, but basically consensus on ends instead, one could dispense with the fine points of democratic procedure and rely on proven expertise instead. Union office incumbency could be premised on “getting for the workers”, management incumbency on “getting dividends”. The underlying assumption was not only quite consensual as regards ends, it also involved deeply ingrained notions of voluntarism and bilateral contractualness in the relations, all deriving from the image of a perfectly competitive market model. These are notions hardly realistic for a mod-
ern economy with institutionalized oligopoly and labor as the least elastic production factor of them all. It is therefore interesting to observe that democracy slowly creeps into authority relations of the economy. Whether due to strain between the normative assumptions regarding economic dependency or to other causes such as better education is not the interesting question here. Interesting instead is that, in the U.S., economic dependency has been subjected increasingly to mechanisms of contracting a common purpose.

Across the labor management divide this is illustrated by the institutionalization of collective bargaining with the democratic strike vote and perhaps more importantly by the fact that the everyday operations of American unions are practically premised on the administration of grievances, a feature which makes them quite distinct when compared to unions in Continental Europe, to say nothing of the S.U. Furthermore, while asking about the economic rationality of strikes as regards worker income does not permit an easy answer, it does seem very evident that preparing for strikes serves very much to legitimate authority within union organization and company alike (BAUM 1962). One must also keep in mind that in contrast to higher offices in the union, shop stewards who are the critical managers of grievance procedures are elected officers in most unions. Whether the issue is quality or quantity of “what one owes the company”, the fact that the humdrum of everyday union life in America revolves around grievances thus illustrates the institutionalization of a mechanism by which men engage, however indirectly and symbolically, in a mutual construction of a common purpose.

Recent developments within management circles show a clearer pattern of negotiating a common order. Here, in larger corporations, management personnel engages in recurrent group rituals that self-consciously abrogate inequality temporarily. In such group-sessions, persons are encouraged to express their ideas and feelings about company objectives and procedures as persons rather than as unequal in a constituted authority structure. After such sessions are over engagement with authority differentials is resumed (SWANSON forthcoming). Overtly such rituals are legitimated in terms of building morale and mobilizing talent and relevant knowledge that would otherwise remain unutilized. This double objective illustrates well the main function involved: legitimating authority through precisely those elements the ex parte code relies on, viz. negotiating a common purpose through the interaction of the allegedly more “real entities”, which are practically constituent groups and ideologically “real people”. What such rituals symbolize is a historically conditioned notion that common ends or “a whole” must be constructed through contract among and from the “more real” parts.

Matters are quite different in the S.U. There the union does not confront management. Instead, with many other organizations, it represents the truer selves of both parties, their common collective selves. Similarly, contract is not primarily a mechanism to articulate bilateral arrangements of rights and obligations ultimately among individuals, but rather a mechanism of center control. “In the Soviet Union, the ultimate premise of the system of contract is not the protection of expectations (and thus of interests) but the protection of the accountability of the manager to the system . . . Obligations flowing from contracts [especially as regards differential rights among unions-RCB] are viewed as subordinate to the basic obligation to implement the collective economic plan” (MAYHEW 1971: 120). However that plan is actually made, particularly as regards the participation of genuinely functional interests as stressed earlier (BAUM 1977; for the Stalin era cf. HARRIS 1976), it emerges formally and finally as an emanation from a center unpolluted by particularist interest which represents the ultimate “reality”, the whole rather than the parts. Consequently, the day-to-day operation of contract serves as a mechanism of reinforcement in action and experience in line with the demands of an ex toto code.

Turning to the area of informal relations in industry, given the requisites of ex parte individualism, one might even venture the hypothesis that further institutionalization of ex parte authority patterns in economic relations would inherently tend toward finding new patterns for informal participation. This should be so to the extent that pressure for an adopted mode of self-realization through deep identification with groups can influence the corresponding patterns of authority legitimation. In the ex toto code case, on the
other hand, the psychological pressures seem to operate in the opposite direction, involving freedom from immediate group pressures as a condition of the attainment of a sense of personal autonomy. Consequently, there, further institutionalization of legitimating authority should take the form of increasing the range of formal obligations, particularly in the sense of formalizing those obligations that hitherto were demanded in more informal ways.

This too is partly illustrated in strikingly contrasting features of union organization in the United States and Continental Europe. With grievances at the heart of the day-to-day operation of American unions, one has identified a mechanism of worker participation which is informal to the largest extent. When the system really works, grievances are negotiated between shop steward and foreman, and constructing a common purpose is managed at that level. But in Europe worker participation appears in highly formalized format. There as demanded by the law of co-determination applicable to larger firms in the member countries of the European Coal and Steel Community, union officials sit on the board of directors of corporations sharing a vote with the representatives of “capital”. While this mechanism does not exactly seem to arouse enthusiasm regarding political potency among the workers (DAHREN-DORF 1965: 121ff.), the contrast nevertheless illustrates nicely the way that different authority codes lead to different institutionalization of legitimating authority in the economy.

But change since the early modern stage not only pertains to the better institutionalization of a given code in a given area of the functional division of labor, it also covers drawing more and more citizens into the same web of distinctly coded obligations. This numerical increase in political participation has been a familiar theme in theories of political modernization. What deserves stress here is not the growth in the amount of participation, which is not in contention, but rather that different modes of participation are involved. Before the advent of ritual group sessions in American corporations middle-level managers hardly ever participated on any regular basis in policy matters. The emergence of the ritual thus signals more “participatory democracy”, hence extending implementation of the code to social categories which were excluded before.

Again, parallel development in a contrasting mode is visible in the S.U. If BAUER’s (1955) “portraits of Soviet life” are not wholly mistaken, there is no doubt that ever larger numbers of people in ever more roles are involved in the “web of plannocracy”. There this spreading value-implementation signals two things. First, while remaining experienced as basically inegalitarian, all dependency relations become more activist. Engagement in such direct or indirect authority relations demand more of all the participants regardless of their particular position in the hierarchy. Being a traditional and “passive subject” no longer suffices. Active commitment and responsibility for failure is demanded from all. Secondly, and through this greater demand on performance, authority relations also become increasingly reciprocal. Whether it is a policeman’s concern with arrests, a kolkhoznik’s worry about weather and wheat, an artist’s pre-occupation with plays, a manager’s mission with output targets, or a housewife’s vexation with food stores, all are subject to the pressures of over-production and in a . . . circle of responsibility, and mutual assistance” (BAUER 1955: 116) of such complicated webs of interdependency as scarcely conceivable in preindustrial conditions. Such relations are experienced as “ politicization” alright, though not necessarily with a capital P referring to matters of state and loyalty to it. More typically, the pressure is on self-realization of man as a being that emerged from a collective, lives through and for it, and yet finds a sense of autonomy in dissociation from these near-others.

Finally, and turning to the area of medical services, once again one encounters different developments displayed on an common background of the universal professional-client relationship. In the medical complex, such a relationship everywhere combines institutionalized inequality in terms of a competence-gap that separates doctor and patient with a presumed consensual commitment as regards the ends to be achieved. The ends concern officially unproblematical and shared commitments that health is better than illness, life better than death. Given these commitments and, furthermore, the known ambivalences underlying the tortuous paths of following them as well as the terror of pain and the inevitable infantilization pressures wherever severe pain strikes, there should have been perhaps no more ideal site of social dependency protected against any change
after the institutionalization of the modern profession of medicine. And yet, one finds how the increasing institutionalization of variant authority codes even encroaches on this precarious dependency area.

Recent years have shown the spread of a legal doctrine of "informed consent" in American jurisdictions (e.g. GRAY vs. GRUNNAGLE 1966—67; COOPER vs. ROBERTS 1971—72). However, tentative, uncertain, and fraught with yet non-understood moral complexity, the legal doctrine of informed consent is a most remarkable development when viewed from the perspective of the increasing institutionalization of the *ex parte* code of legitimate authority in American society. For the whole drift of these court rulings and statutes is to bind the patient to share responsibility with the physician concerning the risks attendant on a therapy selected jointly by both parties for the cure (MEISEL 1975). Looked at from the more traditional conception of a genuine professional-client relationship, this means no less than this: that the party certified for legitimate incompetence in helping himself should now share responsibility with the party certified for relevant competence. Whether this is genuinely possible in medicine in general, to say nothing of psychiatry, can fortunately remain an open question here. Even if it could never amount to much more than faked consent rendered more in response to persuasive pleas and implicit threats than any genuine understanding of the risks of different strategies for cure as demanded by the law, nothing illustrates better the pressure to institutionalize the demands of a given general authority code in different areas of the division of labor than this American doctrine of "informed consent". For it demands, with the force of law, that even doctor and patient must manage to negotiate a common purpose when it comes to something as complex and specific as choosing among a set of alternative therapies. Whatever the reality of the already institutionalized competence gap, the law demands that the parties negotiate a common undertaking across this gap.

While I have no material concerning any parallel development in Soviet medicine, the generally larger role of the Soviet physicians as an agent of social control would seem to make such development highly unlikely there. Characteristically in line with the requirements of *ex toto* authority, Soviet medicine faces far more severe problems of managing autonomy. But that does not automatically and necessarily signal underdevelopment of the professional complex, as a more conventional interpretation has held (SCHLUCHTER 1974). Given the pressure of plan fulfillment writ large as a general characteristic of Soviet everyday life, the pressure towards "malingering", receiving a reprieve from the activist demands of endless obligations, must be unusually high. As a consequence, the Soviet physician too is under pressure to reduce certifying illness which does grant a legitimate excuse from societal performance (FIELD 1957: 146ff.). Insofar as this description still holds and to the extent of medical practice covered, it is evident that, once again in line with the requirements of an *ex toto* code of authority, the Soviet physician constitutes another representative of the more "real" societal whole pitched potentially against the lesser and more ephemeral interests of society's parts, ultimately individuals. So much for some suggestions concerning systematic comparative work on institutionalization of continuity patterns since the early modern stage.

The previous essay (BAUM 1977) and this effort proved an unusually lengthy mode of presenting an argument. Hopefully the cited facts suffice to establish authority and the quest for personal autonomy as critical focal areas in the study of continuities in societies undergoing modernizing change. Hopefully too, the attendant arguments sufficed to establish that our understanding of modernization and the condition of modernity cannot really advance without a simultaneous attention to change and patterns of continuity. Empirical assertions that an industrialized economy is compatible with variant types of national polities are not enough, particularly not when they rest on given cases. It is now a fact that this is generally so (GURR 1974). Therefore, it behooves us to inquire why. This inquiry will have served its purpose if it is received as a first approximate answer to an obviously very complex problem. That answer is: the continuing quest of man's search for meaningful authority and meaningful personal autonomy occurs in culturally distinct fashions. In these matters there is no convergence toward a cross-culturally homogenizing world. Instead, there seems to be invariance in the patterns that were developed in distinct forms during the historical and early modern stages of
development. Such invariance is due to the high level of generality that characterized authority and autonomy conceptions already at these earlier stages. It is also due to the fact that the subsequent and continuous elaboration, codification, and institutionalization of these patterns, throughout all of society's relations, not only supplies societies with a shared sense of historical continuity but also enhances the realization and perfection of societal identities.

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