Authority Codes: The Invariance Hypothesis

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Autoritätscode: Die Invarianzhypothese

Inhalt: Anders als ältere Theorien zeigen die Ergebnisse der neueren Forschung, daß in industriellen Gesellschaften die politischen Ordnungen nicht konvergieren. Füssend auf diesem Befund stellt der vorliegende Beitrag als Kontinuitätsfaktor sozialer Modernisierung namentlich die Codes politischer Autorität heraus. Hauptfunktion derartiger Stile ist es, wie sich zeigt, die Identität einer Gesellschaft im Generationenwandel aufrechtzuerhalten, sie zu vertiefen und zu schützen.

Abstract: Contrary to much earlier theory recent findings demonstrate that polities are not on a converging course in industrial societies. Exploiting this finding, this paper focuses on authority codes as a factor of continuity in modernizing change. The main function of such invariance in authority codes is the maintenance, enhancement, and protection of societal identity from generation to generation.

Introduction

There was a time, not too long ago, when the conventional wisdom of political sociology designated democracy as political modernity. Non-democratic forms of political regime appeared as various modes of „tradition“, destined to be superceded by democracy as a product of universal modernizing change (LIPSET, 1960; CUTRIGHT 1963; OLSEN, 1968, PARSONS, 1964). Common-sense empiricism always objected to this extension of convergence theory from the economic to the political sphere. But it has been only relatively recently that scientific facts deny the convergence thesis as regards politics. Over the last 170 years, no drift towards democracy could be discovered in a large number of the world’s polities (GURR, 1974). In fact, as regards their core normative aspects, forms of polities such as democracy and autocracy, known to mankind well before the age of industrialism, survived the changes associated with the universal transformation of the economy towards its industrial and post-industrial form. It is, therefore, imperative that modernization theory come to grips with this fact. This paper aims at a modest contribution towards that objective by proposing an invariance hypothesis as regards authority codes.

Elaborated at some length elsewhere (BAUM, 1974; BAUM, 1975), modernization poses at least three distinct possibilities: convergence, divergence and invariance. Convergence denotes reduction of cross-societal variance in social structure and process due to modernizing change, divergence denotes further production or increases in such variance relative to some earlier stage of social evolution, and invariance denotes neither one nor the other but continuity in such cross-societal variance since a specified stage of evolution despite and through modernizing change occurring after the specified stage. Heeding BENDIX’s (1967) clarion call that a sociologist’s concern with modernization must focus on the way in which societies, at different stages of evolution, produce solidarities, the variety of distinct types of solidarity they produce, as well as the way in which they organize such solidarities into a system, this earlier work provided some specifications concerning all three possibilities. Continuing this effort, the business here is exploitation of the findings of others for advancement of the invariance portion.

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1 One short way to communicate the continuity of this effort with earlier work may be to present, without much explanation, the functional typology of solidarities I have been working with (BAUM, 1974, 1975). Shown below, this locates the main problem focus of the present piece. This is in the political realm with a minor theme devoted to moral solidarities where I shall use some of WEBER’s findings as regards the generality of value systems that crystallized during the historical stage (stages are described below). With the political focus primary here, the following comment must suffice. Political solidarity requires the spending of time because all exercise of authority presupposes continuity in identity as regards leaders and led (BARNARD, 1938: 138; MAYHEW, 1968: 26). Having changed behavior, legitimized in terms of collective goal attainment, those who have changed must still recognize themselves as the same at a later point in
A concern with invariance is not new. Classic sociological theory approached the problem of change always in terms of the diad change and continuity. For if an entity was undergoing change, it still must be the same entity, in some sense of its essential identity, at least at two points in time. In the classic tradition such identity conferring symbols were usually the structure of values. DURKHEIM's conceptual struggle with the relations between mechanical and organic solidarities across societal stages may serve as one example, WEBER's work on religion as another. In the latter it was the organization of values into a meaningful symbolic whole, including the contents of the commitments involved, which gave a socio-cultural system identity. The values in question covered such diverse objects as religious symbols, images of the good society to have, the good personality to be, relevant time-orientations and the like. A classic of this genre and one with an acute interest in the problem of through-time continuity in societal identity is CASTRO's (1954) work on the structure of Spanish history. But for empirical work these formulations proved almost intractably complex. A great number of value-orientations had to be ascertained, and always at more than one point in time.

To emphasize further how small a portion of a complex issue this paper deals with, two comments. First, authority codes constitute but one element of stratification codes, and it is all of the latter which are central in the invariance hypothesis. Very briefly and with respect to all institutionalized inequalities, stratification codes are value standards that specify: i. how much ine-

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A more narrow, and hence more empirically manageable, focus on societal identity is provided by action theory. Here the integrative subsystem (societal community) is designated as the very core of society (PARSONS, 1966: 10, 16—18; 1971: 12—26). Following that lead, the most theoretically cogent conceptualization of societal identity has been EISENSTADT's (1971a) designation of stratification codes as the identity conferring symbolic structure for society. Among functional theorists, he was also the first to formulate historical continuity in authority codes as a problem for functional system theory (EISENSTADT, 1973). He thus identified one object of invariance. But he did not describe it much, nor did he supply a theory as to why it should display continuity in the face of modernizing change. Doing both constitutes the central objective of this paper.

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Type of Solidarities

Orientation of TIME

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system in question. Political process requires selective attention to the relevant membership identity, not to all aspects of the overall identity of persons. This is true precisely to the extent that political solidarities have been differentiated out from the matrix of a more diffuse identity set which is a function of social evolution.
This paper deals with four issues, organized in sections accordingly. First, examining the findings of others, it distills facts now constituting a critical mass for theoretical concerns with invariance in political structure. Secondly, scope and the general cause of invariance in authority codes is examined. Thirdly, a detailed description of authority codes postulated as invariant is offered. And fourth, specific causes or reasons why such codes should be invariant are provided.

I. Fact and Fancy in the Economy-Polity Relation

A review of post-WW II research in the economy-polity relation relevant for the invariance problem shows broadly three phases of effort. The first was clearly directly influenced by the Second World War which seemed to have engendered an ambivalent cognitive response. Illustrated in PARSONS’ work, there was on the one hand a concern with sources of aggression associated with universal structures of modern society shot through as they are with arrangements in both the familialistic and the occupational realms highly productive of anxiety related to channelled “displaced” aggression; but on the other hand, some notions about socio-political “under-development” among the enemies just vanished were also present coupled with policy recommendations for “development” even at a cost of commitment to private property (PARSONS, 1947; 1945).

Such cognitive hesitancy whereby the recent winners and losers shared centrally important properties did not persist for long. Instead a kind of “main-line view” emerged which in the hands of an influential compact majority came to dominate the scene in the second phase. With theory and fact it argued cogently for a powerful, because very general equation, whereby political modernity was set equal to democracy. Various authoritarian forms of regime were relegated to “tradition” in the “tradition-modernity” contrast. Designating the “democratic association” as an evolutionary universal, PARSONS (1964: 356) endorsed this equation explicitly and unambiguously slightly less than twenty years after the war and has yet to renge from it. Sensitive to the possibility of falling prey to ethnocentrism, some tried valiently to avoid the equation...
but still draft a conceptual map of the shape of political modernity. On inspection their efforts to evade the equation failed (PYE, 1966: 31–88; ALMOND & COLEMAN, 1960: 4–64). Whatever the neutrality of terms such as interest articulation, communications, and interest aggregation, the specifications of political modernity could not avoid covering indeed classic features of democracy such as a free press, and electoral competition for the highest offices. These attempts foundered on the inability to come up with a credible non-democratic functional equivalent for that specific feature which marks democracy as a polity uniquely suited for any complex society, viz. the fact that its very legitimacy principles enshrine the institutionalization of social conflict short of violence. Best illustrated in the work of LIPSET (1960: 45–96) this made the equation near unassailable, and voices of doubt as well as expressions of scorn about the equation (de SCHWEINITZ, 1964; MOORE, 1966; FISCHER, 1968; HUNTINGTON, 1968) found but a feeble echo if the most prominent quantitative empirical work at the time is any indication.

For that research, once it had quantified degrees of democracy, used the „cross-sectional correlation approximation“ to the study of historical change with the advantage of many cases and many variables (CUTRIGHT, 1963; OLSEN, 1968). The results tended to confirm the equation. This was partly due to concealing what qualitative research had already revealed, such as HUNTINGTON’s law concerning „political growth and political decay“ (HUNTINGTON, 1968: 1–92). It was also due to quite prominent failures in the mensurational distinction between political modernity and democracy. For example, despite the fact that OLSEN(1968: 702) intended to improve on CUTRIGHT’s work in this specific respect, he too failed in that eight of his fifteen indicators of political modernity on inspection turn out to be indicators of democracy.

Only historical data archives permitting through-time studies inaugurated the third phase. Documented in three studies, this has already achieved a definite refutation of the „dominant equation“ of the sixties. First, with respect to LIPSET’s link between democracy and its ability to institutionalize conflict, a very relevant question is whether democracy does in fact institutionalize conflict short of violence? Using indicators of domestic violence, FLANIGAN and FOGLMAN’s (1970) inquiry to this question yielded but qualified support to the LIPSET thesis. In general, democratic polities have less domestic violence than non-democratic ones but the difference declines as one moves from 1800 to 1960. Also, poor countries attempting to democratize their polities need violence for success in that endeavour, while relatively rich countries need domestic peace if they are to democratize. The theoretical import of these findings are essentially two-fold. First, they illuminate in new ways a venerated hypothesis about the „birth“ of democracy in the history of mankind which argued that inter-state conflict was necessary for the establishment of democracy in a context of „limited“ warfare among coreligionists (HINTZE, 1941). Second, they establish that accompanying violence prevents successful democratization in rich countries, presumably because men have too much to lose. There is here at least an implicit hypothesis: if a non-democratic regime succeeds in economic development, then it will stay non-democratic wherever democratization attempts cannot avoid domestic violence.

The next important study, modestly and somewhat misleadingly entitled „Origins of Democracy“ (PRIDE, 1970), on inspection turns out to be a test of a very general empirical modernization theory concerning the polity-economy relation. Its relevant findings are amazingly strong confirmations of six propositions: i. where democratization precedes in time social mobilization, countries have stable democracy into the first half of the twentieth century; ii. where the relationship in the former variables is reversed, countries have stable nondemocratic polities; iii. when democratization and social mobilization are associated with each other through time, i.e. with both expanding at similar rates, the outcome is mixed with some cases eventuating in democracy and others not. Essentially the same relations obtain between mobilization and democratization, only clearer yet. Here again, iv. when the former outstrips the latter in time, non-democratic regimes are the result; when the relation is reversed, democracy results (v.); but vi. in the joint movement from low levels of political mobilization and democratization to higher levels in each, there ist a three-way outcome with some becoming stable cemocracies, others stable non-democracies, and a third group “quasidemocracies”.
The theoretical import of this study becomes apparent when one applies the knowledge gained from the CUTRIGHT-OLSEN correlational efforts of the previous phase. For then it becomes exceedingly likely that PRIDE’s indicators of social mobilization (decline in agricultural employment, and urbanization) are at the same time indicators of economic development, and consequently of a country’s wealth. So connected, PRIDE’s findings show no less than this tenable generalization: whenever a polity successfully weathered the storms of social mobilization which seem to be a near-universal accompaniment of industrialization without a change in the basic legitimacy of center political authority, barring external interferences, that polity may well last into any foreseeable future. For is very difficult to imagine domestic pressures for change subsequent to industrialization that could rival both the real need and the urgency to regulate conflicts which is everywhere the outstanding characteristic of the industrialization phase. But one can lift these findings to a yet more general formulation using the language of functional system analysis.

From the perspective of diachronic functionalism in the system’s analysis key (PARSONS, 1969A), PRIDE’s findings suggest the following interpretation: whichever of the four functional subsystems of society is subject to subsystem formation with genuine boundary maintenance before any other, that one will control the development of these others; and this will be the more likely if the subsystem that develops prior to any given other one is also one higher in the cybernetic control hierarchy obtaining among all four.

While probably not verifiable yet, other evidence exists already showing that polity development prior to industrialization is related to persistence in regimes thereafter. Covering the period 1800–1971, ninety-one national states with the exception of the new states established since World-War II, and distinguishing three types of regimes, viz. democracy, autocracy, and anocracy, GURR (1974: 1501) has just shown the following: i. there is in fact a „decline of the „minimal state“ which prevailed in the 19th century and the growth of the „activist“ polities of both autocratic and democratic form“ (emphasis supplied); ii. while there is a trend of greater prevalence in two „democratic“ indicators, viz. openness of chief executive recruitment and constraints on their power, these are not centrally significant with respect to the LIPSET-equation for iii. „levels of political participation, that other bellwether of pluralist democracy, did not change significantly over time. In short, the typical 19th century polity was an autocracy with minimal functions. The typical mid-20th century polity was either an activist plural democracy or, only slightly less likely, an activist autocracy.“ A further significant finding is that persistence and adaptability of regimes are not a function of their type but rather of congruence in authority relations. Thus, contrary to much theory before, there is neither a trend towards democracy, nor is democracy more persistent and adaptable than autocracy.

The available evidence is prete conclusive: industrialism is not associated with democracy. However „systematic“ modernizing change and its products may be in other respects (BLACK, 1966), the universal transformation of an agrarian and/or commercial economy into an industrial one does not impact uniformly on politics. Autocracy as well as democracy are forms compatible with instustrial society. These are the significant facts for a theoretical interest in evolutionary invariance4. They tell us that, in terms of core le-

4 They need but two further comments. First, GURR’s is the first mensural work in coming to grips with the longstanding issue of central import to social system analysis, viz. distinguishing change in the system in service of its adaption to change in environments and change of the system in terms of termination of its „identity“. Taken at face value his findings here would certainly discourage one from even postulating invariance; less than 15% of all his polities ever reached an age of 70 years (GURR, 1974: 1497). Following earlier work (GURR & McCLELLAND, 1971), however, this is due to using measures which rather liberally allow a polity to die. There are no less than twenty-two “fundamental changes” that signal changes of system (GURR, 1974: 1489). Only five of these (GURR’s decision constraints) have any direct bearing on change in the „meaning code of legitimate center authority“ which constitutes the object of evolutionary invariance. Furthermore, as a comparison of his Table 2 and Figure 1 shows, since GURR (1974: 1487, 1489) defines a given regime multidimensionally with attributes of the very same of which also „indicate“ fundamental change of system when a change from one to the other is observed, it is also clear that change of system as measured by him does not equal change of regime. Thus it seems very likely indeed that using cleaner methods would show far longer longevity. If anything, this makes the
gitiacm principles involved, polity-forms known
to man for a long time have somehow survived to
the present. Since what time? That is the next
question.

II. Evolutionary Invariance: Problems of Scope
and Cause

Arguing for evolutionary invariance demands
meeting scope restrictions and embedding the
cause(s), at least the most essential, into charac-
teristics of sociocultural evolution itself. One
question is: invariance since when or what stage
and why? Another question pertains to socio-cul-
tural geography: invariance where, everywhere or
only in specific civilizational areas?

Turning to the first question, the invariance pro-
blem was „born“ during the historical stage of
socio-cultural evolution. Due to the differentia-
tion of personality from culture on the one hand
and society on the other as well as a further „firm-
ing up“ of the differentiation between culture
and society as manifest in the emergence of func-
tionally specialized elites for secular and sacred
affairs (BELLAH, 1964), this stage gave rise to
a series of ethical paradoxes which defied ration-
alization in the logical key of variant but inter-
ally consistent normative obligations. Of these
paradoxes the present account must be restricted
to three: i. the relations between functionally
specialized elites, intercontingent yet each claim-
ing autonomy in its own field; ii. the relation be-
tween central government and sub-units in society
whereby the latter demand autonomy vis à vis
the former but the former bears responsibility
for the coordination of relations among the latter;
and iii. the relation between individual and so-
ciety involving the paradox of ethical obligation
to serve the permanent interests of social organi-
ization far outlasting individual life-spans but also
the mortal interests of persons confronting salva-
tion problems in the short-run.

In response to these paradoxes it is very likely
that intellectual action eventuated in value-gener-
alization which postulated ethical precepts
aiding men in coping with there paradoxes in a
fashion that maintained rather than ultimately
denied the tensions inherent in contradictory
norms. These precepts are designated as codes
here, and only authority codes will be given de-
tailed description in the next section. But at the
historical stage the effects of this new level of
moral complexity were confined entirely to elites
and inter-elite relations in society. The early
modern stage, conceived here as a cross-cultural
universal, then served to push both the problems
and the coping mechanisms in terms of codes
down into the mass level, converting them into
problems that every man hat to confront and live
with.

At the core of the development of ethical com-
plexity stood the emergence of monotheism and,
as an accompaniment, the birth of the idea of
a „responsible self, a core self or true self, deeper
than the flux of every day experience, facing a
reality over against itself, a reality which has a
consistency belied by the fluctuations of mere
Thus monotheism concentrated contingency on
ultimate meaning into one source, with one will
holding through time in all eternity; and it also
involved the recognition of a self as a willing re-
sponsible agency also holding through time, albeit
the shorter span of an individual’s life-course.
Religious symbolism and the relevant moral psy-
chology developed in a matched fashion. And
both of these developments involved a third, the
idea of responsibility to history in the form of
a commitment to an ethical community lasting
from generation to generation. For once an
injunction attains the status of a deistic com-
mandment, issuing from a monotheistic source,
it not only becomes relatively unalterable (inter-
pretable but not alterable by man as regards its
core meaning), it also becomes „binding“ on suc-
cessive generations as regards implementation in
this world. All monotheistic religions involve
ethics of faith. These call for a meaningful total
relationship of the pattern of life with a religious
goal patterned in turn in the form of an abstract
order. And, finally, given the very abstractness of
such an order, situation-specific normative
injunctions of expected conduct develop even-
tuating in a functionally differentiated norma-
tive social order shot through with antithetical
expectations in different situations (WEBER, 1922: 207–209).

In society the roles of believer and secular political subject become differentiated. Conduct in each can undermine the ethical efficacy of conduct in the other, but both too require relative autonomy from each other such that the differentiated norms involved remain distinct from each other. The same is true for the relation between elites with their varying functional responsibilities, the relation between the political center and the political peripheries, and the individual and his organizational attachments. Such mutual contingency in functional variety creates problems of "right" far more precarious and uncertain of solution than was possible at earlier stages because these new levels of differentiation increased the tension between religion and "the world" to degrees hitherto unknown (BELLAH, 1964: 367–368; PARSONS, 1964: 345–346; WEBER, 1922: 209).

The tension between religion and the world called forth special social organization to deal with it, but in a manner that itself enshrined the paradox of ethics characterizing all complex systems since that stage. Elite specialization for different functions does not "solve" the problem, it mitigates it and institutionalizes the tensions themselves. They involve three elites and their inter-relations: cultural elites for religious solvency, political-secular elites for worldly solvency (maintaining the society against internal and external foes, natural and social), and legal elites for articulating and integrating the other two. To be sure, the extent of organizational differentiation among such elites varied enormously in historic societies, being most distinct only in the feudal Occident (HINTZE, 1941), but mutual inter-elite contingency as regards the very legitimacy of functional specialization itself characterized all because everywhere "political acts could be judged in terms of standards that political authorities could not finally control" (BELLAH, 1964: 368). In short, domination on the part of any one elite over another as in caesaropapism or theocracy, where it occurred — amounted to a final denial of ethical complexity itself, constituting an evolutionary regressive "solution".

The same obtained in political center-periphery relations. For it was a characteristic of that stage — and one that was maintained ever since — that polity centers had to assume the right and indeed the obligation to coordinate relations between constituent groups which in turn were in principle accorded some degree of autonomy vis à vis the center (SWANSON, 1967; EISENSTADT, 1963). Normative complexity here also called for articulating partial contrariness: on the part of the center, acknowledgment of the idea of "self-government" to some degree as regards constituent actors but at the same time an assumption of responsibility concerning their inter-relations; on the part of constituent actors, a commitment to autonomous self-direction coupled with one to rights pertaining to a dependency status. Once again, domination of the center over constituent parts or the reverse constituted no solution in that it would undermine the principle of the division of labor that stands behind all normative complexity.

The third paradox emerged in the relations between individuals and their groups. Usually captured in the phrase "obedience to Caesar and to God", the paradox derives directly from culturally stereotyped "individualism" which was also born in the historical stage. Individualism demands the assumption of self-responsibility for outer conduct and inner experience and the ability to communicate that sense of responsibility to others in the management of role-conflict. This puts the individual into an irresolvable dilemma. His salvation chances are contingent on meeting the demands of the world which when organizational are always relatively long-run interests, while responsibility for inner experience demands his attention to individual salvation needs which must be met within his limited life-span, one acutely short-run relative to the life-spans of organizations. Church, state, oikos or army, community or family are regarded practically as "eternal" beings that do not die; but the individual owing valid obligations to the long-run interests of organizations also "validly" owes himself in his short-run. And there is no final solution to the individual's need to respond to the expectations coded on contrary time horizons.5

5 Of course there are more time horizons. Time itself has an evolutionary dimension, to mention one. It is considered a scarce resource in some societies and not in others. Individuals too have their own long and short-run perspectives, to mention another. But
The early modern or "Reformation" stage pushed these paradoxes down into the everyday life of the masses. Mention of that stage raises the second scope restriction, geographical space. All my examples will cover the Christian world, West and East Rome. Thus at least one step beyond the Occident will be taken. And while it still may be more prudent to let this piece serve as an exercise on the theme of Occidental rationalization, interest in general theory suggests that one follow BELLAH (1964) and treat the Reformation stage as a cross-cultural universal. Consequently, it is assumed that the Reformation stage, in those aspects specified immediately below, is treated as having already had, having now, or going to have a kind of Reformation fall-out for all societies.

The Reformation fall-out hypothesis states three things. First, a potential for value-conflicts between relatively autonomous elites exists everywhere. Consequently, a potential for the mobilization of mass fundamentalist resentment against established authority and the extant order by counter-elites exists. Second, the idea of the state as a value-implementive agency charged with "revising the social order" in the name of abstract ethics exists everywhere (BELLAH, 1964: 370). Third, the individual's commitment to the idea of a "self-revising self" or self-improvement and hence the need to balance time-contrary demands of obligation to self and obligation to society has become a cross-cultural universal, though self-consciousness about it may empirically correlate with education thus retaining a certain elitist character.

Looked at through the double lens of HEGEL's speculations and WEBER's findings three sequences flow from the above: i. everywhere politics becomes moralized; ii. everywhere political ethics become historically grounded calling for the engagement of authority relations for the production of diachronic solidarity (BAUM and BAUM, 1975); and iii. given inter-culturally variant ethics at the same level of generalization since the historical stage, everywhere authority relations serve also (among the many other things they accomplish) the implementation of interculturally variant ethics over time.

The universal moralization of authority relations derives from the double commitment to "society as a self-revising and self-perfecting entity" and to "self as a self-revising, self-perfecting entity" (BELLAH, 1964). But while society and personality are now geared to "self-actualization", the former has more time than the latter. However indirectly, this was recognized by HEGEL in his discussion of the question why the early Christians transformed themselves from a sect into a church (AVINERI, 1972: 14, 25-28).

HEGEL recognized four socio-psychological aspects pertaining to the universal moralization of authority relations. First, permanent collective interests far outlasting individual lives form part of the individual's identity. Next, consciousness of death and its associated sense of uniqueness on the one hand and moral commitment to short-run individual salvation interests on the other also make up an individual's sense of identity. The third element is the universal institutionalization and internalization of the idea of contingency between social or role-identities and subjective "personal" identities. The short-run interests of mortals in their ethical chances for self-realization became contingent on collective "immortals" and their long-run interests in ethical self-revision. The role of authority in articulating the two sets of interests and the placement of the burden of making sense out of inner and outer obedience on the individual (through the Reformation fall-out) constitutes the last element. Institutionalized in the concept of the citizen-role as the simultaneous creator and subject of authority, these four elements seem to constitute the sociological core of HEGEL's philosophy of history in terms of "the struggle for freedom from meaningless nature through collective action" (HEGEL, 1837; FETSCHER, 1970: 26-27).

If authority is to articulate long and short-run interests of an ethical character, one necessary requisite is that it be historically legitimized. There is good reason why the historical stage is called "historical". The very function of authority to articulate contrary time horizons presupposes that there is diachronic solidarity, defined as a sense of continuity in ethical identity lasting from generation to generation, and that one function of authority relations is to maintain and enhance such intergenerational commonality in commitment to abstract values. This permits le-
Finally, none of the three paradoxes resting at the core of the political implications of the historical and early modern stages permit of logically clean solutions. They defy rationalization in the logical key of the removal of contradictions. If functionally specialized elites are to be interdependent yet autonomous, no simple mode of hierarchization among them can avoid the dilemma of patterns of domination and so the destruction of autonomy. The same pertains to the relation between the political center and its peripheries. And if an individual is to be constituted at one and the same time of identities reflective of enduring, permanent because collective as well as relatively ephemeral and non-enduring because individual interests with a joint ethical responsibility for both, there remains a contradiction in the temporal aspects of ethical conduct that no logic can overcome. Adaptation to rather than rationalization of these dilemmas is all there is. The ethical rules developed in response to the recognition of these dilemmas constitute such mechanisms. Their intrinsic limits to rationalization is one reason for their persistence. Describing one of these, the codes of legitimate authority, is the next objective.

III. Authority Codes: Objects of Invariance

In varying degrees of explicitness as well as variable format a case for continuity in the conception of legitimate center authority over long time periods has been made for France, The Ne-
Otherlands, The German Democratic Republic, Russia, and the United States. These studies deserve mention even though they do not permit more than a preliminary identification of some sort of code as the object of invariance. CROZIER (1964) argues that neither the conception of the nature of authority nor that of authority relations have changed in France from the Ancien Regime to the present. Here these constants are two: what men perceive to be the intrinsic nature of authority (in this case "a propensity towards omnipotence"), and how men must regulate interpersonal dependence to make subjugation to authority tolerable (in this case "a counterpropensity towards procedural formalism" that forever searches for a utopia; where no persons have power by reducing their discretionary powers to zero).

Another classic case is The Netherlands which served to develop the conception of consociational democracy. Here again it has been demonstrated that a code developed in the 17th century (GEYL, 1964: 148–172) has persisted to the present (LIJPHART, 1968a). The central characteristics here are great deference to functional authority on the part of followers for leaders which secures unusual leadership autonomy, and, among elites, an explicit accommodative style of mutual tolerance concerning variant value-commitments. Legitimate authority at the center rests on acceptance of the veto from minorities.

In the German case there runs a line of continuity in corporatism which starts with the "absolutist" strains of Prussia's estate society in the 17th and 18th century and continues in identifiable constitutional features of Imperial 19th century Germany, the Weimar Republic, National Socialism, and contemporary East Germany (GDR). To be sure, the corporatism at issue here which places the collective interest of all supraordinate to the interests of constituent groups was weakest in early 18th century Prussia which still seemed for the most part the reverse principle. Nevertheless, the rationalization of law during that century (Allgemeines Landrecht) in Prussia featured such characteristics as placing the legal burden of defense on the aristocratic estate which entailed classic characteristics of liturgical political resource mobilization (WEBER, 1922: 1006–1069; BUSCH, 1962; SCHOEPS, 1966: 79–100; DIETRICH, 1966: 99). According to WOLFE (1974: 323–330) this mode of "corporatism from above" found its continuation in recruitment to the senate (Bundesrat) by monarchical appointment in Imperial Germany (1871–1918), in the two legislatures of the Weimar Republic (1919–1933) where the Economic Council of the Reich had separate legislative powers, the guild controls over the economy attempted by the National Socialist regime (1933–1945), and the practice of Blockpolitik that characterized the German Democratic Republic (1949-present). The central feature of this system is that it "is representative", of functional interests "but not democratic, in that the choice of goals is dependent upon the outcome of a continuing struggle between private and functional interests" (WOLFE, 1974: 329–330) which seems essentially devoid of procedural regulation at least when compared with the competitive electoral process in democracies.

Writing directly about legitimacy codes of political authority EISENSTADT (1973) has recently claimed their continuity in Russia from Czarist days to the present. In this instance BENDIX (1956) has been able much earlier to document continuity in a related legitimacy element, viz., managerial ideologies. In Russia, and in contrast to the West legitimating economic activity always involved the triangle state-entrepreneur-employee. One can even generalize this to state that legitimating social action in Russia always involved the articulation of an agency presumed to represent the interest of society and therefore "to hover above" all special interest in society, on the one hand, and the rights and obligations of dependent strata on the other.

Finally, though exaggerated, HUNTINGTON'S (1968: 93–139) claim that political development in the United States essentially remained stuck at the level of the Tudor polity lends itself to an interpretation of stability in the legitimate conception of center authority as resting on "the divisions of power at the center" principle which did not essentially change in the two-hundred year history of this nation.

7 Far greater discontinuity in West German national politics has been stressed by DAHRENDORF (1965). Probably due to occupation by democratic powers and more democratic regional traditions, the matter cannot be elaborated here.
So much for some pertinent qualitative data on the theme of historical continuity in authority codes. But in stating a proposition of non-change in this area, the most important question is: which codes? It is a fair guess that history and sociology alike share Mannheim’s dictum of “fundamental democratization” as a piece of conventional wisdom. And it should be noted that of the five classic cases enumerated above it was only the Netherlands and the United States which had democracy at the time of the Reformation stage. The other three moved from the “divine rights” principle of absolutist monarchy to the principle of “sovereignty of the people”.

The codes for which I argue “invariance” are not the more conventional ones. They do not directly regulate who has the right of command; they do not directly specify the mode of participation in decision making at the national center; and they do not immediately govern modes of succession to office. The codes at issue here are more abstract and more “hidden” than these other “surface rules”. These “hidden” codes specify the meaning of authority relations by stating only the grounds on which an authoritative decision is binding on units of the collectivity in question. At the micro-level these codes constitute normative images about the individual-group relation; at the macro-level they refer to the “society as a whole-constituent parts” relation.

For illustration three cases seem useful. Two of these are contemporary types of democracy, another is a historical one. Now being democracies, all three share the idea that votes “legitimate” governmental authority. But the first two have one kind and the third a different meaning code of authority.

As is well known, while in Anglo-Saxon democracies the outcome of the electoral process deter-

8 “Divine rights”, “rule through dei gratia” should not be confused with direct religious legitimation. On the contrary, these terms appeared at the tail end of the struggle between princes and the Pope, a conflict over the question whether priestly coronation constituted or merely affirmed temporal power, and one that sealed the differentiation of sacred and secular power. Ever after, governmental power rested on a presumed commonality of interests of units organized in a state. Thus sovereignty of the people merely signals an extension of the size of the relevant units (STERNBERGER, 1968).

mines who shall form the government and who the opposition, this is not the case in consociational democracies where the question is settled in a post-electoral process of negotiation among party leaders dealing with the problem of forming a coalition government. Clearly the idea that neither the popular nor the electoral-college vote ought to determine who becomes President of the United States would meet with fierce resentment in America. Yet that illustrates only different “surface” legitimacies involved. Lijphardt (1968a, 1968b, 1969) has demonstrated that consociational and competitive democracies use opposite rules as regards the incumbency of executive office; the former use an “anti-majoritarian conception of legitimation” the latter a “majoritarian” one. But behind this contrast stands a common “hidden” element which asserts the need to let distinctive and different parts participate directly in the process of ultimately arriving at decisions which are to be binding on all. It reflects the conviction that the societal whole is never more and can be never more than a negotiated social order, a product of “somehow” lesser reality which relies for its bindingness on negotiation among units with greater reality which are either voters directly, as in the competitive case, or representatives as agents of aggregate votes constituting real social groups with diverse purposes and interests, as in the consociational case.

Now, at that level of abstraction, the Venetian Republic was quite different as regards the conception of differing realities and the associated norms. Venice had a Grand Council to which all adult males belonged, “regardless of creed, occupation, and education” as we might say today. That council elected an executive with very short terms of tenure (Swanson, 1967: 39–41). Specifically then, Grand Council membership was premised on what all had indisputably in common as granted by nature. For the Venetians this meant that a greater reality was attributed to what all had in common than to the diverse purposes of constituent groups. And it was to the commong rather than the diverse parts that they assigned significant normative meaning as regards the legitimacy of authority.

In sum, meaning codes of authority are at issue here. They specify the grounds on which obedience is owed. And it is these meaning codes
rather than other rules regulating legitimate authority which should show evolutionary invariance, such invariance pertaining to the meaning principle involved but not to its legal codification as regards all situations. The latter remains subject to continuous elaboration and refinement. For the sake of convenience in keeping them distinct, I should like to propose new labels for them. Thus where a notion prevails that society as a whole is merely a negotiated social order deriving from the direct interaction of its “more real” constituent parts one can speak of an “ex parte” code of legitimate authority; and where the reverse is the case, as in the above example from Venice, one can speak of an “ex toto” code. These meaning codes of authority presuppose the separate existence of images of “parts” and “whole” in the symbolic universe of a society. Given such separate images, the special nature of political relations comes into focus. These involve the articulation of the diverse and often conflicting interests and purposes of the constituent parts with those interests, activities, mobilization, as well as disposal of resources of the “whole” which must necessarily be expended to maintain the latter as a going concern (SWANSON, 1967: 31–32). SWANSON called “the parts” associations and “the whole” social system.

Accordingly, the essence of political relations is to be found in the fact that they articulate the “associational” and “social system” aspects of collective life. Beginning with their differentiation and persistent since, every central government faces the task to coordinate the activities of groups in society which a) have a certain autonomy vis à vis central control and b) are characterized by diverse and frequently conflicting group interests. Consequently, ever since, the politics of center-periphery relations is saddled with a dilemma. Central government depends on the support of organized social interests with diverse purposes. But it also claims a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Therefore, central government must assert the existence of one common interest transcending all particularist group interests. Since one can safely assume that some periphery groups are better organized than others which also means that they control more of a society’s scarce and unequally distributed resources than others, it follows that at any given moment in time central government is more contingent on some groups for support than others.

The dilemma of politics then is a product of a factually unequal contingency of central government on the periphery and the normative need to promulgate a universal overarching common interest as a source contingency which is credibly devoid of group-discriminatory characteristics. That dilemma cannot be “rationalized away” in the sense of making the contradiction disappear. A continuous search for greater normative acceptance of the dilemma probably constitutes the only “rationalization” to be found here.

Finding such normative acceptance of the dilemma in the Occident involved the development of meaning codes for legitimate authority which resulted from a correlated struggle about religious ultimate and social meanings of political interdependence. There was a relationship between the dilemma of politics of historical societies and the emergence of monotheism as well as between struggles about the nature of the deity as regards the question of its immanence and the way the dilemma of legitimate authority was “settled” (SWANSON, 1967: 23, 42, 232). For purposes of generalization beyond the Western case and making the postulate of a Reformation fall-out hypothesis work, SWANSON’s analysis is very useful. Stripped off its content-particularities, this correlated religio-political conflict resulted in political legitimacy principles highly suggestive of the very nature of finding evolutionarily successful coping mechanisms with such dilemmas.

The general formula seems to be this: At the higher stages of evolution men typically face dilemmas irresolvable in principle but needing resolution in practice. Coping with the dilemma in a fashion “adequate to” the evolutionary normative complexity achieved amounts to development of some interpretive schema that a) places the two horns of the dilemma into a hierarchical relation to each other but b) recognizes normative contingency between the two thus avoiding domination of one over the other. The interpretive schema must preserve the idea of a tension-laden contingency including relative autonomy between higher and lower components. In authority relation the components are “parts” and “the whole”, or the “associational” and the “social system” aspects of social organization.

There are but two such interpretive schemas or
ideal-typical solutions to the politics dilemma in the SWANSON data; and these are so general as to suggest generalization beyond the West. In one solution intrinsic primacy was assigned to the social system aspect of organization, in the other such primacy was assigned to the associational aspect. In both, however, the element of lesser importance was explicitly recognized. For in both cases a monotheistic deity symbolized men’s experience with the purposes and activities of independent organizations by emphasizing the idea of “an overarching source of decision and purpose (providing) unity among groups diverse in purpose” (SWANSON, 1967: 23, emphasis supplied).

SWANSON’s findings are the relevant facts. They tell us that a correlated struggle about the nature of God and the nature of meaningful authority evolved normative solutions concerning man’s contingency on man and God so general as to probably apply elsewhere.

Consequently, it is very likely that the Reformation fall-out produced or produces two “final” ideal-typical solutions to the authority dilemma of complex society in one restricted sense. The sense covers principles on which obedience is owed. Under the ex parte code one must obey because diverse social identities have constructed a common purpose; under the ex toto code one must obey because commonalities have been mobilized to defeat diverse identities. Under the former, a common purpose is a negotiated social order, under the latter the common purpose is an immament given that must be awakened. Only these solutions to the dilemma of politics are final. But elaboration in terms of spelling out their meaning and codification particularly as regards cooperative systems with different functional significance for society constitutes an ongoing evolutionary process.

As illustrated in the case of the Venetian republic, a democracy with an ex toto code, there was no longer any tight correlation between type of polity and code already during the Reformation stage. One should not expect one in subsequent stages either. But that does not mean complete independence between code and type of regime. Using PARSONS’ four-function paradigm aids in the following: a) classifying polity types in industrial society, b) locating these “hidden” meaning codes of authority, and thus showing one reason for their persistence through c) demonstrating that they articulate antimony functions in PARSONS (1963a: 259–260) media paradigm applicable to any differentiated polity. These issues are taken up below.

IV. Reasons for Invariance in Authority Codes

There are three main reasons why such authority codes proved resistant to fundamental change in their meaning. Their very “hidden nature” facilitates a double-function: their use in contributing to diachronic solidarity or the maintenance of societal identity over time and adaption to changes in the legitimacy fashions of the international system with which all polities become increasingly interdependent. Fascist symbolism, for example, happens to be in disrepute at this time and various forms of democratic and socialist symbolism are in vogue9. Fidelity to “hidden” and adjustment of “surface” rules thus enables societies to remain the same yet get along. Secondly, such codes make acceptable fundamental irresolvable contradictions in center-periphery relations bearing on the “parts”-“whole” dilemma. Finally, it can be demonstrated that both codes, the ex parte and the ex toto, permitted successful “encoding” of norms regulating all four political functions that any polity has to cope with. These functional norms are also relatively “hidden” and they vary. Therefore, modern polities, whether democratic or non-democratic in “surface” appearance, have functionally equivalent but ethically variant modes of political process which permit additional flexibility in changing “surface” legitimacies yet maintaining continuity with the past.

Locating the Authority Codes in a Functional Typology of Modern Polities

There seem to be four basic types of political regime extant in industrial societies: consultative authoritarianism, corporatism, competitive democracy, and consociational democracy.

Following WEBER in the recognition that charis-

9 I owe the idea of international fashions in political legitimacy to a public lecture of JUAN LINZ at the University of Pittsburgh, 1976.
ma exists purely only in status nascendi rules out totalitarianism as a stable type. Furthermore, while the one case where it occurred in a society with a fully developed economy, Nazi-Germany, had little chance in developing routinization of charisma, the decline of STALIN's personality cult and the subsequent failure in the Soviet Union to develop another, points to the transformation of totalitarianism in the modern world into what is called here "consultative authoritarianism." Studies of conflict management and more general analyses (PLOSS, 1965; KOLKOWICZ, 1967; STEWART, 1969; MEYER, 1965; FISCHER, 1968; HOUGH, 1969) seem to permit the following clues as regards the authority code at work. First, functional interests must be disrobed of their functional particularisms before they can legitimately float demands or the proffering of advice. Whether the issues are "general education" as against "early specialization", "conventional" as compared with nuclear defense technology, build-up of industrial capital or expansion of the consumer goods branches in the economy, contenders of influence on center-decision makers must present their case not in terms of particular interests and their rights, but in terms of every one's duty to advance socialism or some other formulation stressing the supranerving interests of the whole over the parts of society. Second, interest articulation requires the appearance of stalactite (from the top downwards) mobilization (NETTL, 1967: 271ff), while interest aggregation proceeds according to shifting alliances among functional interest in fact, though in theory according to superiority in divining the meaning of unchanging Marxist-Leninist principles under changing environmental conditions. Finally, whatever the reality in the balance of forces between bureaucratic vested interests and the interest of clients, the parallelism of "technical" and "leadership" hierarchies serves to symbolize the supremacy of party, representing "the whole," over all other interests, representing "the parts." Yet the capacity of leadership to draw on special expertise in policy-making has certainly been institutionalized to the point where any obvious inferiority to the United States (ROSE, 1967) on this score is no longer discernible.

The classic case of corporatism can be found in the Iberian Peninsula and its Latin American offshoots. Already a "centralized state" in the 15th century rather than featuring the political policentrism characteristic of feudal hierocracy, the long-term military use of religious beliefs, and the forging of Iberian consciousness out of the encounter of Christianity with Islam and Judaism supplied historic and early modern Spain with a certain amount of theocratic tendencies, a "theobiosis" (CASTRO, 1954: 17, 19, 132, 153). Towards modernity, and particularly overseas, this history worked itself out in a caesaropapist direction characterized by an uncanny mixture of oppressive idealism and slipshod ideological sloganizing with imported models of and for society behind which seem to stand neither understanding nor genuine commitment as regards anything fundamental in the political structure of society (CASTRO, 1954: 127; TANNERBAUM, 1965: 136-137; LINZ, 1964). The caesaropapist tendencies are mild, mostly avoiding real domination and occurring only as a last resort if there is conflict at the same level.

The distinctive feature of contemporary corporatism is "expressive" politics organized around personalism. This demands the use of power in the service of a reputedly common belief officially in theory, and its expenditure in response to particular group interests in practice. There is also insecurity concerning feasibility of the promise of common beliefs and a near-selfconscious refusal to escape from the importance of believing towards a more practical ordering of authority relations through reduction of diffuseness in obligations (CASTRO, 1954: 55). Somehow,

10 While not as much industrialized as seems desirable for claiming politi compatibility with industrial society, one should note that when one defines a metropolis in terms of a population density of 100,000 or more and with 65 percent or more of the labor force in the non-agricultural sector of the economy, the metropolitan population of Latin America averaged 27.4 percent in 1960 with a range of 48 percent in Uruguay and 6 percent in Haiti. Also during that year, of 20 Latin American countries one had a metro of 6.7 million, three countries a metro of 4 to 5 million, and six countries metros of 1 to 2 million inhabitants (HARRIS, 1971: 172-175, 179).

11 Ideological "mimicry" (LINZ 1964) according to which such issues as fascism and communism "amount to frivolous sideshows, in servile imitation of foreign models" (CASTRO, 1954: 127), pertains to political not necessarily other structures of society such as education, economic relations, and foreign policy.
authority relations must remain personalist and universally moral (TANNE

Though pertinent available research remains less clear than in any of the other types of regime (STEVENS, 1974; MALLOY, 1974; SCHMITTER, 1971), the following aggregate picture may be offered.

The whole-parts dilemma in terms of a differing "reality" ascribed to society as a whole and its constituent parts remains compromised in the Hispanic authority code. Such compromise involves a conception that some greater and lesser forms of cultural traditions must interact if a common weal is to become manifest. Hierarchically organized functional interests of diverse kinds must engage in contest seeking to subordinate each other if the true interest of the whole is to become visible. This follows in part a historically conditioned instability in the corporate stratification typical in this case. For where "belief rather than deed counted, . . . and the shining sword of the Apostle . . . made them all equal" (CASTRO, 1954: 157), respect for hierarchy was potentially challenged by appeal to ascriptive egalitarianism. Practically and in contemporary forms this means that inequalities among internally hierarchically organized corporate groups which form the relevant units of stratification in this case cannot be institutionalized in as stable a fashion as in the other regimes. Stratification in Iberian societies remains subject to continuous challenges and reassertions through the political process (ROGOWSKI and WASSERSPRING, 1971). Such struggles take the form of multiple parallel hierarchies attempting to construe an overall hierarchy on their relations. Whosoever gains supremacy, for however long, claims the role of promulgator of the interests of all. If this is not a fundamentally wrong interpretation of HUNTINGTON's (1968: 192–263) "praetorian society" metaphor, it is essential to keep in mind that relative constancy in executive control of one institution, such as the military, does not at all amount to the dominance of one functional institution. For these systems are support-contingent, and policy outcomes are a function of changing institutional alliances on which executive incumbents depend. The other contrast feature to consultative authoritarianism rests with the compromise on interest articulation patterns typical for corporatism. Following the explicit recog-

nition of the need to represent functional interests with genuine quasi-autonomous rights of their own which seems to coexist with the notion of the absolute need to "dictate obligations" from a supraverning perspective, interest articulation takes a mixture of stalactite and stalacmite (from the bottom up) forms which tends to be positively correlated with the rank position of a given hierarchically organized functional interest in the pecking order of all such interests.

In sum, the most telling difference between consultative authoritarianism and corporatism is the presence of a systematically rationalized ideology in the former and its relative absence in the latter. At the same time, despite the compromises, the authority code displays more ex toto then ex parte features.

Following the work of LIJPHART and HUNTINGTON already referred to, the principle features of the competitive and the consociational types of democracy would seem to be summable as follows. They share a notion of the constructed collective interest assigning greater reality to constituent parts of society. They differ in that pursuit of this construction by pure contest can be afforded only in those cases characterized by a relatively homogeneous poltica culture. In the consociational case where the latter is fragmented and historically based on ascriptive collectivities, such a path is precluded, and all efforts are geared toward aggregating those interests compatible with a shared commitment to the maintenance of essentially segregated political subcultures. Consequently, stalacmite mobilization is quite legitimate in competitive but factually "broken" in consociational democracy where the electoral process is completely divorced from interest aggregation and amounts to a legitimation ritual engaging parallel hierarchies of zuilen or Lager with stalactite mobilizations all oriented to fixed constituencies. As to administration in terms of the patterning of bureaucracy-client relations, democracies, regardless of type, seem to be characterized more by clients sharing responsibility with administrators for policy implementation or a near-egalitarian basis than is the case in consultative authoritarianism and corporatism.

A more systematic account of the elements of authority codes used above will be rendered below. At this point one needs to emphasize that
what has been outlined is in the nature of idealtypes. So conceived, it is possible to locate these types in a four-function classification.

Following PARSONS (1959, 1953, 1951: 180–200) any subsystem of action can be analyzed from a perspective of having to solve four universal functional problems (adaptation, goal-attainment, integration, and pattern maintenance). Since no system can fully solve all four problems at the same time, one can classify them on the basis of which of the four problems is given primary emphasis. This applies to systems at any level of analysis and therefore to the polity. The notion of one-function primacy as a classificatory device does not vitiate the need to solve all problems through phase-movements of a system (PARSONS, 1953). All it says is that polities can be usefully classified according to which one of their four functions they seem to assign paramount importance. The focus of classification is a functional perspective of the polity-society relation. One can distinguish overall organization to utilitarian interests (the a-primacy polity), ii. maximizing the provision of direction for all functional interests in society (the g-primacy case), iii. maximally serving the integration of functional interests in society (the i-primacy case), or iv. constituting primarily an expressive arena of constituent parts (the l-primacy case).

In this light competitive democracy figures as an a-primacy case. Historically the United States is the classic example. Here modernization of society occurred through private economic and social forces, not through government. Thus the polity mainly adapted to social and economic change (HUNTINGTON, 1968: 93–139). LIJPJHARDT’s (1968a) analysis of The Netherlands makes her the classic example of consociational democracy which has i-primacy. The Soviet Union ranks as the most important empirical example of consultative authoritarianism, a case of g-primacy, and the “praetorianism” of many Latin American cases are the ones best approximating corporatism with l-primacy. For ease of overview, Figure 1 locates these ideal types in the usual format of Parsonian functionalism.

If the most salient feature of feudal hierocracy was indeed the curious mixture of the contrary elements of “personalized fealty” and yet a “contractual stipulation of right and duties”, of “hereditary controls over land” and yet “a de-

FIGURE 1: The Modern Societal System and Its Polity Types*

![Diagram of the Modern Societal System and Its Polity Types]

* Following GOULD’s (1976) revised interchange paradigm clarifies the polity types’ one-function primacy through the lens of mediated interchanges.
personalized rent nexus" (WEBER, 1922: 1074), then Figure 1 illuminates how the rudimentary parliamentarism of the waning middle ages in the Occident constitutes a precursor of the two modern democratic types. "Personalized fealty" and "hereditary controls over land" stress the famous integrative aspects of the medieval synthesis which found their extension in consociational democracy where fealty has been transformed into accommodative elite behaviors presupposing a shared primary commitment to jointly work against all divisive forces in society, and where the "hereditary control over land" has been institutionalized into the ascriptive organization of political support. On the other hand, the "contractual stipulations" and "the depersonalized rent nexus" display the maximization of adaptive functions of the polity to society so characteristic of competitive democracy. As all summarizing devices carry the danger of misleading oversimplification, it should be stressed that the "bordering" of competitive democracy on the economy does not imply the predominance of unmitigated cash-nexus politics; but it does refer to the dominance of regulating autonomously adaptive groups of all types relative to other political objectives. Historically, a parallel case holds for the two non-democratic modern polities. Both of these would seem to have retained important elements of liturgical political resource mobilization so prevalent in patronial bureaucratic empires. One, the corporatist form, constitutes an extension in decentralized form, the other, an extension in centralized form.

Turning to the most general explanation why there is invariance in authority codes, it is useful to reemphasize two points. Following the logic of one-function primacy, it must be clear that all modern polities have their consultative authoritarian, their competitive, their consociational, and indeed their corporatist elements. As ROSE's (1967) study makes clear with the case of medicine, there certainly is representation of functional interests in American political process. The same is true for Britain as well as the Soviet Union (GILISON, 1972). Indeed functional interest representation is a moral duty of institutionalized expertise in modern society in general (BAUM, 1972). Though the modes vary profoundly in detail, professionalism means autonomy, hence a corporatist element is ineradicable from modern political process everywhere. Equally, executive functioning involves an element of authoritarianism, interest aggregation one of consociationalism, and the pursuit of office an element of competitiveness.

Next, the opposite function types of polities share one meaning code each. In the democratic case this is the *ex parte* code, in the non-democratic cases the *ex toto* code. In the present perspective of the universal functional elements of any polity, this means that elements of each code are also present. They cannot be spelled out here. But displaying these features, as in Figure 2, shows

**FIGURE 2 Universal Functional Aspects of the Modern Polity**

![Diagram](image)

that these contrary elements of codes regulate antinomous functions in the polity.

The _ex parte_ elements regulate interchange across the double functional boundary between external-instrumental and internal-consommatory function; the _ex toto_ elements perform such regulation for internal-instrumental and external-consommatory functions. Important is that each of these "hidden" authority codes encompasses the codes of media specialized for opposite functions and that they involve positive or negative-sanction media, respectively. The _ex parte_ code encompasses the codes of money and influence, both positive-sanction media despite specialization for opposite functions, which gives democratic political process its voluntaristic flavor with its emphasis on "rights". The _ex toto_ code encompasses the codes of moral authority and power, both negative-sanction media despite specialization for antinomy functions, and this gives non-democratic political process its flavor of constraints with the emphasis on "duties". But in so encompassing the codes of societal media with opposite functional specialization, the authority codes permit a polity to oscillate between opposite functions without threat to stability in the primacy of one authority code. Since one-function primacy in any system means relative under-servicing of the functionally opposite needs and interests (placed diagonally in the usual functions table), it is not only analytically likely that _primary_ phasing in political process involves oscillation back and forth across diagonally opposite functions because the typically neglected needs demand attention first when strain builds up, it is also probable, by virtue, that the function-adequate societal media come into play without threatening a stable commitment to the meaning codes of legitimate authority. This is the most general reason for stability in such codes.

Thus societies can engage in continuous self-revisions through the use of stability in the meaning of authority because the two meaning codes under consideration regulate opposite functions. This feature not only constitutes a long-term solution to the political paradox "born" during the late historical stage, it also enables societies to engage in continuous self-revisions yet maintain their distinctive political character over time which in turn constitutes one element of continuity in societal identity. Describing these authority codes further reveals additional reasons for their stability.

**Invariant Codes: "Parts" and "Wholes"**

The codes at issue here constitute normative rules which specify the grounds on which a decision by central government _ought to_ exact obedience by all units in society. Thus an _ex parte_ code asserts that such a decision is binding on all units of society because special and particular interest in society have participated in its making in their status as such special and particularist interests. This implies a theory about finding the common or general will. That theory states: the only way to find what the common unitary purpose of a society is all about is to let the diverse and particularist purposes of constituent groups engage in direct negotiation, whatever its form; for it is constituent groups which make up a society and only their direct encounter will render what all have in common. In contrast, an _ex toto_ code asserts that a center decision is binding because none of the many and diverse special particularist interests in society have participated in its making in their status as diverse particularist interests. This, too, implies a theory about finding the general will, and it proclaims: the only way to arrive at the common will is to let special roles designed for its discernment do their work undisturbed and unencumbered by divisive interests, because society in its essence is an immanent reality rather than a negotiated order and all its constituent particularist parts derive their legitimate status only from the function they perform for the whole.

These types of codes show impressive historical stability over long time periods. Counting only polities which maintained their independence throughout the periods under review, and classified in this dichotomous fashion, SWANSON'S data reveal the following information: (1) Over a 290 year period from 1490—1780, 20 of 26 polities maintained stability in these codes; (2) over about a century from the Reformation Settlement to 1780, 26 out of 27 maintained stability (SWANSON, 1967: 238—241).

The codes at issue here simply say nothing in themselves concerning who participates in center decision making but they say a lot about the
symbolic legitimations of such participation. Under the *ex toto* rule legitimate participation in goal-choice action at the political center on the part of the technical periphery demands that such periphery symbolically divest itself of its periphery characteristics, while the *ex parte* rule insists on the opposite: symbolic retention of periphery characteristics.

One should note that the latter rule is more easily practiced than the former. One can simply rely on the "integrity" of "societal nature", as it were, drawing on the relevant resources from the division of labor in the occupational complex. That rule indicates what the respective functional primacies of adaption to and integration of societal forces imply, viz. leaving the drive towards the implementation of societal values largely to non-political organizations while letting the polity concentrate on their facilitation and regulation, respectively.

But the tasks of politics is relatively more difficult under the *ex toto* rule. Here periphery participation at the center's goal-setting and choice-making activities has to be subjected to a kind of prior laundering process that strips off particularisms of value differences inevitably associated with possession of special skills and knowledge. Such a laundering process must achieve the awakening of value commonalities, however, without significant costs in special knowledge and skill capacities. To illustrate, it is rather likely that an economist's image of society is largely composed of economic data. Indeed in his role as economist it is part of his special professional morality to see his society in terms of economic requisites. The psychiatrist's image of his society is probably a product of his mental health lenses and, once again, that is part of the professional obligation. Yet when it comes to value choice, that is, the political center's most salient political obligation which is to determine what men *shall* be made to care more about: economic growth or distributive justice, defense or mental health, then the *ex toto* code commands that no particularist lens be permitted a chance to pollute what men shall be so made to care about, by the use of power, and hence at the recipients' risk of negative sanctions, whether situational such as jail or internal such as guilt (PARSONS, 1963a, 1963b, 1968).

The moral use of power at the center always involves a double dilemma. One is that it is the center's obligation to make and enforce such choices and a kind of sin to evade, and sometimes even to delay, the need for choice. The other dilemma is that these are real choices in the short run for individuals, though not in the long one for society. They do involve differential resource allocation drawn from a symbolically equal, common pool of citizen obligations yet affect various individual and group interests within society quite differently. But normatively they serve an ongoing entity, immortal society, where the presumption of eternity precludes the agony of trade-offs.

Dilemmas of this kind permit no "final solution"; they cannot be rationalized in the sense of making the illogical logical after all. As concerns the contrasting principles of legitimate authority which connect the short and longrun interests, interpretable meaningful acceptance is all they permit. And people manage with both codes by symbolizing the construction of a kind of differential social reality of shared interests across the divisions of labor and time. With the *ex parte* code it is achieved by postulating a greater reality of "the parts" in terms of associations as well as individuals; using the *ex toto* code manages the problem in opposite fashion: reducing parts and their diverse purposes — and ultimately even individuals[^12] — to the function they play for society as a whole.

Yet such general reasons concerning the invariance of authority codes scarcely suffice. There must be more specific reasons yet, demanding systematic presentation.

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[^12]: That individuals have principally a shorter life-span than society is clear; but the difference in relevant time horizons seems less clear in the case of associations in society, be these economic organizations, political parties, religious, recreational, or civic organizations. Nevertheless, in comparison to the relation between citizens and their government which are authoritative relations, the electoral period apart, affiliation with sub-collectivities in society are symbolically treated as far more voluntaristic. Consequently, associations within society are more dependent on the individual interests of their members in day to day operative affairs than is government. This suggests that society's parts, the associations within the division of labor, are more short-run-contingent organizations most of the time than is government when claiming to represent the enduring interests of society as a whole.
Further Reasons for Invariance in Ex Parte and Ex Toto Codes

A first, most obvious, weakest, and empirical "reason" of invariance is this: Insofar as change in these codes calls for a significant reduction in power itself, a characteristic in much of contemporary talk about "participatory democracy" at least in its more anarchic versions, change in codes would seem to have no chance whatever. Whether one considers Gurr’s (1974) demonstration of the universal decline of "the night watchman state", trend data in public (Deutsch, 1970: 66–67) or in welfare expenditures (Curtright, 1965), the whole drift of modernizing change covers importantly and centrally increase in society's capacity to act as a cooperative system. Whatever the indicators, whatever the type of regime and its ideology, long-term expansion of power is a characteristic of all, long-term reduction of power a feature of none. This reality of world historical trends seems adequately reflected in social theory. Whatever may divide opinion among theorists, the indispensability of power in human organization is not among contentious issues. Whether the perspective is philosophical (Russett, 1938: 10), focussed on conflict (Dahrendorf, 1959: 219), systemic-functional (Parsons, 1964) or small group-empirical (Jacobson, 1972: 11), the fact that a definite power structure is essential to organizing social existence unites them all. And powerlessness as an aim of modernization has found no serious proponent.

A second reason for invariance in authority codes, more theoretical in nature, involves changes in the stratification system that the historical and early modern stages wrought. The net effect of these changes was a new role for authority as a mechanism of articulation between obligations to society as a whole and obligations to subcollectivities in society.

There seems to be consensus that primitive society was characterized by inequality, not however, stratification in the sense of multiple and distinct dimension of rank, posing the problem of legitimating correlations among them as well as the relatively stable standing of units on them. Stratification in terms of the organized and institutionalized concentration of resources and the assumption of differential responsibility in their use on the part of some units for society as a whole was "born" with the "two class system" of archaic societies. (Bellah, 1964: 365; Parsons, 1964: 342–345). Now while true that some primitive societies were already characterized by wider networks of solidarities organized on principles of loyalty other than kinship (Eisenstadt, 1971b), the birth of stratification proper brought about a general situation, one applicable to all societies at that and later levels of development, where raw kinship alone could not conceivably suffice for societal solidarity in general. Organized differential possession and/or control over scarce resources that lasts from generation to generation has to be justified in terms of postulating a collective interest supravening the seamless web of kinship simply because families are no longer equal. This provides an entirely new dimension to the extension of ascribed and diffuse loyalties from the kin networks to wider groupings which Eisenstadt (1971b) had already discovered in primitive society. The new dimension is that this non-kin society-wide solidarity now had to attain a political cast, articulated through authority. For wherever there is stratification legitimized in terms of society’s capacity to act as a whole, political ensocialization into citizenship loyalty of some form becomes a necessary condition of a stable stratification system itself. Furthermore, after the historical and early modern stages stratification serves more than integrative functions. All these more developed societies are "active ones" in the sense of using stratification for the implementation of values, sacred and secular (Bellah, 1964).

Consequently, obedience to authority — and not only to that of the state but to all those of the cooperative systems a person is involved in a high division-of-labor society — now faces the problem of simultaneously serving two moral needs. On the one hand, obedience is now postulated as the duty to make contributions to society’s long-run path as a self-revising system. Symbolically this duty is expressed in loyalty to law and center institutions. On the other hand, persons are also expected to be loyal to the many subcollectivities in the economy, the polity at various levels of government, the societal community, and the educational complex which in the aggregate constitute society’s capacity to act collectively. With a division of labor, there is no way to perceive consistency of purpose between subunits and so-
ciety at large in any concretely convincing way at any particular point in time. And that is why loyalty to differential association has to be symbolically matched with loyalty to society as a whole (PARSONS, 1963a: 260–261).

Such symbolic matching occurred through the development of authority codes at a level of generality sufficiently high to encompass all authority relations in society. Empirically such commonality in authority relations as regards their legitimacy bases varies and, as a result, so does the stability of polities not only hypothetically (ECKSTEIN, 1961) but also in fact (GURR, 1974). Analytically, however, growing consistency in the legitimacy beliefs underlying all authority relations in society is an evolutionary product; or, put otherwise, one mode in which societies evolve pertains to their growth in internally consistent authority codes which constitutes the backbone of their very ability to act as actors that are geared to reform and growing "self-revisions" from generation to generation. That not only requires that authority codes be very general so that a common interpretative legitimacy overlay can cover function-differentiated associations, it also requires their stability through time. And while there seems to be no direct empirical evidence with respect to either, indirect evidence supports this claim. That loyalty to society as a whole does not conflict with loyalty to sub-collectivities is an impressive cross-national fact in industrial society precisely in an area where older theory predicted the opposite; namely, class and national loyalty (DEUTSCH, 1970: 80–81).

A third, and more empirical, reason why the basic principles enshrined in authority codes may be exempt from further evolutionary change after the early modern stage rests on a very high probability that they had already then crystallized a dichotomous set of rules for the four principal functions that any authority code has to regulate. Again, there seems to be no direct historical evidence available yet. But PRIDE's (1970) findings regarding the relation between economic and democratic development discussed above strongly suggest that two such sets of rules go back to the era of state formation. A PARSONian perspective identifies the four functions in question as follows: i. legitimation (L); ii. interest aggregation (I); iii. resource mobilization or interest articulation (G); and iv. bureaucratic administration (A). What is suggested here is that the two codes at issue had implicit rules covering all four aspects. Drawing on terminology familiar in political sociology and on the work of well-known authors permits presenting these features in tabular format.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Ex Toto</th>
<th>Ex Parte</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>symbolic divestment of periphery</td>
<td>symbolic retention of periphery</td>
<td>EISENSTADT (1973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>presumption of raison d'État</td>
<td>contest theory of arriving at common will</td>
<td>DAHRENDORF (1965: 161–244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregation</td>
<td>political role for its discernment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>stalactite mobilization</td>
<td>stalgmite mobilization</td>
<td>NETTL (1967: 271ff.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articulation</td>
<td>domination of client by the state bureaucracy</td>
<td>cooptation of clients and greater equality between bureaucrats of the state and clients</td>
<td>BENDIX (1947)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be sure, the theoretical perspectives from which these familiar themes were developed vary profoundly. DAHRENDORF is an outspoken convergentist and NETTL's stalactite-stalgmite dichotomy also involves a traditional-modern dimension. BENDIX comes closed to a maintenance of difference position, while EISENSTADT originated the idea of evolutionary invariance. What is important here, though, is that the compatible special function rules are general enough to regulate political process in regimes with quite varying concrete features. Therefore, first, if such rules already existed in however rudimentary a form establishing but the principles indicated at the early modern stage, they should suffice for continuity after because of their ability to cover with appropriate interpretive layers all four functions despite massive subsequent changes in their detail and concrete implementation such as mass participation in politics, the increasing role of ex-
pert counsel in the policy formation process, the
growth in governmental load through state wel-
fare development and a universal decline in the
financing of cultural development (most notably
science and technology) from private sources.
Therefore, second, if it is these rules within each
code that permit a polity to oscillate between
antinomious functions across the diagonal in the
four-function table, as pointed out before, persis-
tence of such rules is possible because through
such oscillation a capacity for continuous change
in the face of historical continuity of the ethics
of politics has been institutionalized. There is no
further intra-societal pressure for change in each
set of authority codes once crystallized because
they suffice in regulating phase movements in
functionally specialized socio-political process.

Conclusion

Modernization theory must encompass more
than a preoccupation with convergence simply
because different types of political regime have
failed to converge. The theory of integration of
complex society requires further development to
include the problem of temporal order or how
solidarity is maintained between successive
generations. Not too long ago the question of so-
ciety was addressed in terms of national
character studies, but too simplistic a use of psy-
choanalytic concepts may well have brought
about premature disillusion with the results.
But that does not mean that the basic questions
have been solved.

This paper has addressed all three of these
problems through focusing on authority codes.
Certainly, that is a highly selective focus on a
very complex problem. Certainly, nothing even
approaching adequate empirical data can be
found in it. Hopefully, just sufficient facts and
reasoning has been supplied to open up what
appears to be a stalemate in theory: the more en-
compassing nature of modernization in general
and the nature of political modernization and
modernity in particular.

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