Toward a Spatial Theory of Intra-Nation Modernization in Advanced Societies: The West German Case 1965–1969*

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Inhalt: Die Wiederkehr politischer Konflikte in westlichen Demokratien hat das wachsende Interesse hervorgerufen, die räumlichen Bedingungen (spatial patterning) der sozialökonomischen Entwicklung und ihren Einfluß auf das Wahlwahlsystem in Massengesellschaften näher zu untersuchen. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht, einen Theorieansatz zur Diskussion zu stellen, der in der Lage ist, die räumliche Komplexität der Beziehungsverhältnisse, die die entwickelten Gesellschaften heute aufweisen, auf internationaler Ebene angemessen zu erfassen, wobei sie zugleich versucht, am Beispiel Westdeutschland Daten zur empirischen Überprüfung vorzulegen. Ist der theoretische Ansatz primär darum bemüht, die Implikationen räumlicher Art, die die Beziehungsverhältnisse in Gesellschaften prägen, für die entwickelten Nationen generell anzugeben, bezieht sich der empirische Teil der Studie auf aggregierten sozialökonomische Daten sowie Daten von Wahlergebnissen, die auf Wahlkreisebene für Westdeutschland ermittelt wurden.

Abstract: With the recent resurgence of political conflict in the Western democracies has come a concomitant increase of interest in the study of the spatial patterning of socioeconomic development and the resultant impact on the electoral bases of mass politics. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a broad theoretical framework for coping with the spatial complexity of societal relationships at the intra-nation level in advanced societies, and second, to present some empirical evidence for its falsification in the West German case. While the focus of the theoretical framework is directed toward accounting for spatial variations in societal relations within all advanced nations, the empirical portion of the paper relies on aggregate socioeconomic and electoral data drawn from the West German Wahlkreis (voting district) level.

I. Introduction

One of the most important and basic processes of social change is that of modernization. Regardless of — or perhaps because of — its importance to social science research, the dimensions of this process as well as its spatial implications at any point in time remain blurred and discussions as to what in fact constitute "modernization" may on occasion produce more intellectual heat than light.

Reflective of both a social process and a condition, the conceptual role of modernization has varied. It has served both as a conceptual "umbrella" under which other terms have been variously associated, and in addition, has also served as little more than a synonym for such related concepts as development, Westernization, and industrialization among others.

Yet, although each of these terms are closely related, each also intuitively infers something distinct and apart from modernization. Frequently differences in meaning implied by the concept have been the product of differences in approaches to its study as a process. For example, one such approach — comparative historical studies — views modernization as a pro-

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1 The ambiguity of the "modernization" concept is discussed by the M.I.T. Study Group (1967), KONTARI (1973), TIPPS (1973) and FREY (1974).

2 A large and expanding volume of historical comparative studies on modernization is now available. Studies of selected nations include BLACK (1966), HUNTINGTON (1966), and BROWN (1969). Much of the work in Western Europe on this subject has flourished with the LIPSET and ROKKAN paradigm serving as the collection and research guide. These studies include the QUAM-Project (Historical Analysis of Modernization), see FLORA (1974), and the HIWED-Project (Historical Indicators of the Western European Democracies). The results from the latter project were presented at the International Sociological Research Workshop on Moder-
cess best understood by tracing its movement across very long periods in time between certain selected countries.

This approach appears to most often stress the unique aspects of societal change at the expense of moving toward a more general theory. Often lacking the rigor necessary for the deduction of clearly specified propositions (see HUNTINGTON, 1971), historical comparative studies largely fail to account for the immediate and contemporary role of spatial variations in contrasting levels of modernization within advanced societies.

A second general approach to the study of modernization has been directed more toward accounting for differences between and within contemporary societies. This approach has been viewed from both the micro and macro perspectives. When viewed from the micro perspective, the multi-level syndrome qualities of modernization have been frequently ignored, and instead it has been considered as strictly an individual level phenomena. DAVID APTER (1965) for example, has suggested modernization to be a particular case of a more general set of developmental phenomena. His attention is focused, as are most micro theorists of modernization, on ideology, motivation, mobility and other characteristics associated with the individual in society. The efforts of the micro theorists have been commonly directed not toward the systemic-level syndrome as a whole, but toward the study of individual behavior as it is influenced by – and in some cases, influences – modernization.

Yet theory-building with respect to modernization at the macro level has lagged behind other approaches. One reason for the failure of the macro approach to keep pace was the effect produced by the disclosure of the composition and other fallacies. Following their identification, many scholars were reluctant to continue their work with ecological data. Instead they sought the safety of individual level data and theory. The result for comparative research was a welter of interest and activity at the micro level and something approaching stagnation at the macro level.

Nevertheless progress has been made toward building a theory of modernization. Modernization has been linked in transitional societies to political change through social mobilization (DEUTSCH, 1961), to increased political participation (LERNER, 1958; HUNTINGTON, 1967), to the interaction of selected empirical variables in two specific nations (BRUNNER and BREWER, 1971).

It is at the macro level that ecological data analysis and a concomitant expansion and refinement of modernization theory are most needed. Theory building at the macro level is intended to focus inquiry at a level of analysis above that of the individual. For example, research conducted at this level is interested in the spatial interrelationships and collective properties of social groups and economic development. Focusing on macro level relationships should not necessarily be viewed as deterministic however (see SPROUT and SPROUT, 1965), since environmental influences do not always inflict fatalistic outcomes on individual behavior or on socioeconomic and political processes within the system.

5 An excellent bibliography on modernization studies is found in EISENSTADT and ROKKAN (1973).

6 It has been suggested by SCHEUCH (1969) that the higher level of any two-level measurement or explanation may in fact be considered the environment of the lower-level unit.

7 The “ecological fallacy” is found in its original form in ROBINSON (1950) and has long had an effect on social science research. MENZEL (1950) evaluates ROBINSON’s work. The reverse fallacy, that of the use of the individual correlations in place of ecological correlations, is discussed by SCHEUCH (1966). A systematic treatment of possible fallacies is discussed by ALKER (1965).
to the movement toward a postindustrial society (BELL, 1971; TOMASSON, 1970; HUNTINGTON, 1974) and apparently even to an inevitable progress toward popular democracy (ALMOND, 1963). A few early but important studies have begun the difficult task of isolating some of the characteristics associated with modernization (ALMOND and COLEMAN, 1960; HALL, 1965).

Before setting out to identify the basic components of modernization at the macro level, we will first delimit the scope of this inquiry by restricting it to the intra-nation level. Thus we will not be concerned with the condition as it applies across nations or across cultures. Instead our attention will be directed toward spatial modernity variations within single advanced societies. Within any given advanced society, these varying spatial stages in modernization can be located, observed and empirically compared by dividing the entire society into any relatively large number of subnational areal units. Subsequent to the collection of spatially-aggregated data within the single nation, reliable comparative analysis can follow.

Intra-nation modernization as a process operates along several dimensions and generally can be considered one of systemic change largely patterned and therefore bearing resemblances within, but also between nations. However, modernization can never be considered a uniform process within (or across) nations (GUSFIELD, 1966; SHETH, 1973). It has some impact on all segments of nearly every society, but its influence is extremely uneven. Regardless of a nation's total overall level of modernity, spatial differences will exist within the nation simply because the modernization process affects some spatial units sooner than others, some more rapidly than others, and some more thoroughly than others.

II. System-Level Processes of Modernization

In proposing a theory of intra-nation modernization for advanced societies, we will begin by first identifying its processes of system interaction, and second, by specifying its component spatial stages. The elements of modernization which interact as system-level variables are: 1) economic development, 2) societal development, 3) political integration at the macro level, and 4) the cultural dimension at the micro level. A fifth system-level variable which interacts in all cases within nations is the regional-historic dimension. This element is not part of the modernization process as such, but is a macro level dimension upon which the modernization process acts (and interacts).

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON (1974) has noted that few attempts have been made specifying what political conditions might be expected with the arrival of the next stage of modernization within advanced societies — the postindustrial stage. The meaning of economic and social development -- as is the case with modernization with which both are often confused — also appear unclear from the literature. Economic development has been defined quite simply as movements of real income per head (see e. g., LORD ROBBINS, 1968). Similarly, societal development often has been characterized as merely the process of urbanization measured by increased density per square spatial unit. Both of these definitions, as will be discussed in more detail below, do injustice to a process which is in reality much more complicated.

Socioeconomic development as a system-level process generally establishes new and increasingly complex relationships within society. In order to maintain system equilibrium, socioeconomic change of this magnitude must be compensated for by some form of political adjustment. There is always a "lag effect" between developmental change and the adjusting process of political integration, resulting in system tension. What is crucial is not only de-

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8 Studies of modernization in contemporary advanced societies is reviewed in both HUNTINGTON (1971) and VIG and STIEFbold (1974).

9 Both MARX and DURKHEIM saw the interdependence between the social system and politics. Each also saw change in one sector producing tension and change in others. This is not to imply that politics is incapable of affecting the modernization process, either as an initiated influence or as feedback as the result of earlier change. The former condition is to a large extent a micro level issue and to that degree lies beyond this paper's scope. The latter concern is discussed below.
velopmental change which creates new bases of cleavages within a society therefore, but also the capacity of the political institution to respond and to create the conditions for political adjustment. Certain amounts of tension in a system is normal to human societies. However, repeated and continued failure to politically account and adjust for significant and continued developmental change will eventually result in critical levels of tension leading to some form of system transformation, e.g., revolution. The mixing of developmental rates among subnational spatial units will be critical therefore, in influencing how well or in what manner a polity will adapt or respond.

The composition of a nation’s regional-historic dimension, although not immediately part of the modernization process itself, is another important factor as to the adaptability or response rate of a given subnational unit to modernization\(^{10}\). As a macro level dimension, the historic continuity of a subnational spatial unit is highly instrumental in determining the rate and character of that unit’s contribution to the overall level of national modernization. Soil quality, access to navigable waters, and mineral deposits (RICHARDSON, 1969; HECHTER, 1972) are the types of factors associated with subnational spatial units and their locations which may be crucial in determining the kind and degree of benefits that they can reap from the process of modernization (NORTH, 1955). When the regional-historic dimension and the processes of macro modernization (socioeconomic development and political integration) are combined, they form the macro determinants which affect and produce differences and uniformities.

It can be expected that modernization will arrive at different times and will adapt differently in each spatial unit. Therefore, for any advanced society different levels of modernity can be found scattered across the national surface. It can be expected also that a spatial clustering effect will occur. On the basis of analytic comparison, all spatial units will exhibit greater within-unit similarity than similarity with the external area (COX, 1969).

In short, although the modernization process will arrive at a different time in each spatial unit and adapt in a different manner, it will maintain nevertheless sufficient basic characteristics of similarity, even between the most divergent subnational spatial units, to provide the basis for making important theoretical assumptions and to warrant conducting empirical tests.

### III. Three Spatial Stages of Intra-Nation Modernization in Advanced Societies

Within all advanced nations three spatial stages of modernity, each identified by its own distinctive socioeconomic characteristics and political behavior, are assumed to co-exist regionally. Using indicators specified by the three-stage spatial theory, regional units within all advanced societies can be measured empirically as to their respective overall conformities in areal modernity. Having built national measures of modernity first by accounting for regional variation within each nation, across-national comparisons then can be made.

Each stage of modernization differ fundamentally in its relations of economy and output characteristics; in its complexity; in its social organization, scale and detachment; and consequently, in its system of political conditions and requirements. The focus of the theory is directed toward this latter set of relationships, particularly in terms of the political cleavages and voting response surfaces that are associated with each modernization stage.

Economic patterns within the traditional stage tend to reflect high levels of independence and competition, but are at low levels of scale. The economies of subnational spatial units analogous to this stage may display a craft technology and are pre-industrial, rural and often agricultural. They also may include other types of economic activity such as fishing, forestry or mining. Low levels of consumption are suggested, particularly with non-locally produced goods and services.

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10 Locational and spatial considerations, with some exceptions, have been overlooked until recently in social science research. This condition was prevalent following the refutation of the early geopoliticans whose work was considered deterministic, simplistic and non-empirical. In the past several years, spatial considerations have been reintroduced as legitimate and necessary concerns for social scientists. See COX and REYNOLDS (1974).
Populations of traditional spatial units find it quite difficult to escape from their socioecono-
mic position since it is difficult to effectively instigate economic or social development from within. There are a number of reasons to account for their difficulty to modernize including the problem of increased costs.

In addition to a general scarcity of investment capital or access to sufficient and proximate resources, as for example appropriately trained labor, economic centers in the traditional spatial unit tend to be fewer in number, produce less volume, and be further apart. They are in a word, generally less efficient and less competitive. Unlike the more highly developed non-traditional spatial unit, they are not proximately tight nor do they have the same highly developed transportation and communication nets. Transportation costs in the traditional stage tend to be significantly higher since the population is sparse and less concentrated. The result is a higher relative price for within area produced goods and services resulting in a tendency for less demand. This limitation among others means that not only is there a lower level of development in the traditional stage, but there is also a much reduced likelihood for change initiated from within the spatial unit itself. Rapid economic development by the traditional unit is most often only possible following a massive input of assistance from outside the unit.

Although the traditional stage suggests overall homogeneity among political and social values, units may be sharply divided over the acceptance or rejection toward localized change implied by modernization. Three models within the traditional stage of modernization can be identified, each characterized by a different set of orientations toward the modernization syndrome. The first traditional model is representative of peripheral or backward areas strongly hostile to the modernization process, and resistant therefore to socioeconomic development and political integration into the system. In an advanced and modernizing society mass political expression in this spatial model would be largely anti-systemic.

The second traditional model is composed of units in which the modernization process is view-
ed favorably, but because of disadvantages associated with the regional-historic dimension (e.g., lacking nearby but necessary resource deposits) — or possibly for other reasons — developmental progress lags behind the rest of the nation. Opposition in this spatial model is directed not against the social and political system of the nation itself, in contrast to the first model, but against the policies of the ruling or system parties. Working within the normal institutions and processes of the social and political system, political movements or parties representative of the second model are members of the „loyal opposition“. They are not opposed to the system as such, only opposed to the system parties which determine national policies. In spatial units analogous to the second traditional model, increasing support will be given to those political groups promising a program of redistribution and accelerated development.

The third and last spatial model is composed of those traditional units experiencing rapid development, frequently through the auspices of governmental redistributive programs. Such areas can be expected to exhibit a pro-Governmental bias in their voting and general political behavior.

The industrial stage is distinguished from the traditional by a new and complex set of economic and social functions. The transformation and growth in scale of economic patterns and relations is critical and operates as a catalyst variable on society and politics. This is a fundamental departure from traditional stage spatial units in which communal relations are primary, self-subsistent and local.

A long list of socioeconomic indicators make up the industrial stage. These include high levels of industrial output, consumption and a massive exploitation of the natural environment; an increasing division of labor, growing levels of per capita and class-related wealth differentials, changes in the quality of living, increased opportunities for upward mobility and increased prospects for future change. Subnational spatial units analogous to the industrial stage are urban, often with very high levels of population density. Less effective formal or legal controls have largely begun to replace informal or face-to-face societal controls. In terms of social relations, the nuc-
lear family remains intact, but new associational
groups have replaced extended family and
kinship ties. Individuals in the industrial stage
tend to be "other" directed rather than exhibi-
ting communal attachment.

Political loyalty is no longer identified solely
with the community and its values, but focuses
instead on class and occupational identities.
Political cleavages often are identified on a
functional rather than segmental basis. The
growing secularization of social and political
values moves political life away from such con-
cerns as religion, language, and communal iden-
tification toward a new type of amalgamation
in the form of the mass political party. At the
beginning of the transformation of the industrial
stage, a particularly intense political struggle
may erupt between rising and declining social
and economic forces. The resulting conflict,
whether violent or not, is associated with change,
moving from one stage of modernization (e.g.,
the traditional) to the next (e.g., the industrial).
Nevertheless, in advanced societies the process
of ordering new patterns of political access and
influence once begun, is soon established.

The high density of industrial spatial units trans-
lates to considerable political weight and facili-
tates electoral mobilization. Since each industrial
stage political party must compete for support
on the basis of saturating amounts of informa-
tion and mis-information, and must therefore
battle with other parties to gain the public's
attention, mass involvement is increased through
the use of political promises and ideologies, in-
cluding both utopian and Weltanschauungen
types. Since advanced nations are filled with
a constant volume of communication "noise",
projecting a clear image to the voting electorate
in industrial spatial units is a difficult but neces-
sary task for political survival. Unlike the tradi-
tional stage political party, the industrial stage
party has no natural political identification
with the voter such as a common religion or
language. Spatial units characteristic of the in-
dustrial stage have as their population a congo-
leration and diversity of voting types. In order
to win a plurality of votes the image an indus-
trial stage party presents at election time must
have some element of clarity and distinctness
to induce potential supporters to vote.

At the same time a political movement or party
must also project an image to the voting public
which is multifaceted and inoffensive if it seeks
to win a majority at the national level. It must
not alienate various wings of its own supporters
or increase voting activity or otherwise win sup-
port for the opposition party. Industrial stage
spatial units are characterized by great diversity,
and electoral mobilization can mean the differ-
ence between success or failure at the polls.
Voting participation among spatial units analog-
ous to the industrial stage would not necessari-
ly be high compared to participatory levels for
non-industrial spatial units, however, because
levels of electoral participation for industrial
spatial units are most heavily influenced by elec-
toral modernity ratios among spatial units with
respect to the political parties at the national
level.

The third spatial variant — the postindustrial
stage — represents a further evolution of mo-
dernity toward higher levels of complexity,
mobility, efficiency and detachment. It is with
this stage that ecological social science in the
future must be most interested, since it is in
this direction that future change will evolve.
It must be kept in mind however, that it would
appear most advanced nations by the mid-1970's
had only begun to enter this phase of the modern-
ization process. Advanced nations today are
characterized by a quirkwork of both industrial
and postindustrial spatial units. The total level
of modernity of any given nation can be empiri-
cally defined and verified by its ratio of post-
industrial, industrial and traditional spatial units.

The postindustrial stage implies great economic
and technological change. The raw exploitation
of resources in the industrial stage is reduced
in postindustrial spatial units with new emphasis
being directed toward adjusting to the environ-
ment. There is a significant expansion of the
tertiary and service industries, with a concomi-
tant decline in the relative importance of basic
and primary industries. A high ratio of white
to blue collar and other workers is indicated
for this stage. Basic economic patterns tend to-
ward specialization, increased automation and
technocracy (including in the agricultural sector),
Improved services, integrated transportation
and communication nets, and increases in in-
formation capacity and application. Basic non-
agricultural patterns in the postindustrial stage tend away from an emphasis on quantity as in the industrial stage and toward quality.

Social stratification structures continue to change in the postindustrial stage as does the role of labor. Social mobility and the quality of educational opportunities continue to increase. Organizational infrastructures become increasingly complex as indicated by increased differentiation and specialization. Social access is opened to those groups which were previously denied entrance, such as women. General health services and quality are much improved. Society tends to remain secular but is suburban rather than urban, with the high population density of the industrial stage decreasing in suburban postindustrial spatial units.

The individual continues to detach himself becoming highly mobile and autonomous in postindustria, and is „self“ rather than „other“ or communal oriented. The bonds holding together the nuclear family weaken and a decline in the birth rate and a rise in divorce is experienced. The work ethic becomes less paramount and is slowly replaced by problems associated with increasing leisure time. Less effective formal and legal means for social control continue to replace informal and societal means. Social success is defined by degrees of self dependency, while social relations have become impersonal and distant. Detached and operating on a vast scale, postindustria is the era of the large, pervading and distant bureaucracy.

Electoral response for postindustrial spatial units are generally determined by the total national modernity level of the society. In advanced nations characterized by few postindustrial spatial units, and therefore by definition, many industrial spatial units, postindustrial units will tend toward „loyal opposition“ against the ruling parties. Unless drastically threatened, postindustrial spatial units will not support anti-systemic political movements or parties. Postindustrial units do not seek to overthrow the system within which they have accrued what are seen to be the majority of benefits, but only seek to maintain their advantages. Thus in an advanced national welfare economy, postindustrial spatial units generally will oppose continued or increased redistributive policies. Recognizing their relative advantage over the majority of other units, the basic political goal for the postindustrial stage unit is to maintain its position of advantage.

Once the number of postindustrial spatial units have increased sufficiently to form a ruling political coalition or otherwise win a plurality at the national level, the new postindustrial political majority will move from „loyal opposition“ to that of Governmental party support. The party or coalition supported by postindustrial units will be expected by their supporters to retract at least some of the previous socioeconomic welfare programs left behind by the industrial stage political majority.

It is particularly with the approaching transformation by postindustrial spatial units from a secondary to a primary numerical position that new conflicts can be expected to rise to the nation’s surface. Once the majority, industrial spatial units now find themselves in a secondary position. The historical change of nation-wide political majorities from the traditional to the industrial which in most contemporary advanced nations came about in the period from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, witnessed violent outbreaks of conflict. A second and modern transformation from the industrial stage majority to the postindustrial stage majority will result most likely also in marked increases in conflict levels. It is quite possible that the political structures and response capabilities of the polity itself may be tested in every advanced nation as increased levels of system strain are experienced.

IV. Regional Development Imbalances and Spatial Political Majorities in Advanced Societies

Two political conditions for advanced societies have been identified: 1) the stage in which industrial spatial units form the political majority, and 2) the stage in which postindustrial spatial units form the political majority. Although modernization remains a transitional and subtle process, no evidence has yet been presented indicating clearly any nation to have yet passed into the postindustrial stage political majority.

The placing of former extrapoltical welfare responsibilities upon the state had begun for most
advanced societies in the earlier phase of the industrial stage majority, and has since resulted in a growing list of additional new demands being placed on the state for action. In meeting its new responsibilities, the advanced welfare state today faces two basic problems. Increased complexity and interdependence has rendered management a necessary but difficult task, while at the same time, modernization and the industrial stage majority have served to increase the capacity for economic extraction and control. Both of these problems have made the matter of political allocative distribution a more arduous and sensitive problem. The welfare state has reacted to these new demands and difficulties at a time in which decisions depend on the utilization of technological capacity in an increasingly complex society and on the command of technical expertise, by becoming highly specialized and bureaucratized in its policy making and administrative functions.

Throughout the industrial stage majority increased governmental responsibilities in the economic sphere are paralleled by increased governmental responsibilities in the social sphere. In the post-industrial stage majority, the expansion of political responsibilities by the government into the domain of societal needs can be expected to continue or even increase. Governmental responsibilities in the economic sphere, on the other hand, can be expected to decrease.

In the postindustrial stage majority highly modernized in-nation blocs at the macro level will be formed sharing political interests directed against redistributive efforts — until and unless a higher fourth stage of modernization is evidenced. The new ruling postindustrial Governmental party or coalition can in normal conditions only maintain its position of political power through a policy retracting the programs left behind by the previous industrial stage majority. Yet the new coalition comprising the postindustrial stage majority immediately faces a dilemma. A policy fulfilling its mandate of retracting allocations previously granted to less-modernized spatial units — particularly in the postindustrial era in which various components of economic development seem by nature to concentrate more and more economic power in the hands of the few — can only result in ever increasing regional modernization inequality. Under these conditions, as new cleavages and divisions are introduced across the surface of the social system, widening imbalances gain the potential for increasing whole-system instability, perhaps even bringing into question the legitimacy of the system itself.

On the other hand, social responsibilities in the traditional and even in the industrial stage, in contrast to postindustria, are held by family, close friends, or associational groups. In times of personal need primary relations form the basis of social security. As advanced societies move toward the postindustrial stage majority however, political responsibilities must increasingly provide the security that basic social relations once offered the individual. The result will be an expected continuance and expansion of societal-related political responsibilities for governments.

Most if not all advanced nations today continue to function politically in the industrial stage political majority. Furthermore, since all societies today continue to exhibit developmental imbalances and with it spatial inequality, the primary political responsibility for authoritative allocation has become the determination of the kind and amount of socioeconomic resources and services for redistribution. Although spatial differences within nations have existed historically, contemporary wide-ranging modernity contexts and the welfare allocative system have made regionalism an especially salient and critical issue. One reason for this has been the tendency for spatial units exhibiting modernity similarity to manifest similar political goals and objectives.

To this problem is added a second; the advantage of surplus wealth evident in the more advanced nations. With expanded transportation and communication facilities, it has become less important for a given economic center to be situated in geographical proximity to its maximum utility. Spatial units in prosperous welfare states can now make political claims for the establishment of economic centers within their boundaries, even though that location may not be the most economically feasible one. As a result of extreme national competition in the earlier phase of the industrial stage majority, societies could not afford to distribute economic functions on a more even basis. In the past, economic centers were founded usually in locational proximity to na-
Table 1: A four Factor Analysis of West German Social and Economic Variables* 1960–1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socioeconomic Variables (%)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Private Households with Telephones, 1970</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Divorce Rate, 1970</td>
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<td>.37</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Autos Per Capita, 1965</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Private Households with Two or More Residences, 1970</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Civil Service Employment, 1961</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>-.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Jewish Population, 1970</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Salaried Employees, 1961</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.63</td>
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<td>8. Private Households, 1961</td>
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<td>9. Industrial Employment, 1961</td>
<td>-.44</td>
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<td>10. Density (k2), 1963</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.66</td>
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<td>12. Gross Wages Per Capita, 1965</td>
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<td>.79</td>
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<td>-.15</td>
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<td>13. Agricultural Employment, 1961</td>
<td>-.29</td>
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<td>14. Self-Employment, 1961</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.88</td>
<td>-.04</td>
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<td>15. Agricultural Holdings under Five Hectares, 1960</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.41</td>
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<td>16. Ratio of Foreigners to German Citizens, 1970</td>
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<td>.32</td>
<td>.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Population Change, 1960–1970</td>
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<td>-.03</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Recipients of Social Assistance and Pensions, 1961</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.73</td>
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<td>19. Protestant Population, 1961</td>
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<td>20. Refugee and Expellee Population, 1961</td>
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<td>-.03</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative Proportion of Total Variance (%)

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.01</td>
<td>47.71</td>
<td>60.51</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based upon a varimax orthogonal rotation using Wahlkreis (N=214) level data. Unless noted otherwise, the above variables are in percentage form.

tural resources or other determined criteria which were unevenly distributed across the national surface. Populations usually moved to the location of the economic center. Today, it is often the economic center which through allocation has moved to the population.

A third and final spatial consideration, affecting the contemporary political salience of regionalism, is linked to the centralized allocative decision-making capacities of the advanced welfare state. Not only has the welfare state in the industrial stage majority continued to improve its allocative capacity, but it also has raised the proportion each societal member is assessed for centralized allocation. Thus, decisions made within the central structure have assumed a greater consequence as to who gets what, where, when and how much. This political adjustment has meant for the industrial stage political majority, and thus for the present, an increase in the economic importance and political salience of distributive output decisions. In short, because the greater

V. Developmental and Political Spatial Cleavages in West Germany

To provide an empirical "falsification" (KAPLAN 1964: 36–38) for the three stage spatial modernization theory, aggregate socioeconomic and political data1 were collected from West German sources at the Wahlkreis (voting district) level. Twenty socioeconomic indicators were selected for factor analysis. This technique has come under particular criticism, and with some justifi-

11 The data is drawn from SÄNGER and LIEPELT (1965) and Statistisches Bundesamt (1967 and 1971). Electoral data is taken from Zweitstimme percentages.
cation, as being frequently misused as a social science research tool for processing data. To safeguard against such criticism, each of the twenty socioeconomic variables were carefully selected on the basis of theoretical relevance and statistical reliability. Four factors (Table One) emerged from the analysis explaining 70.6 percent of the total variation.

Factor (I) provides evidence for the empirical verification in the West German case of the post-industrial stage of modernization. Service, white collar and bureaucratic properties of the post-industrial stage appear to be reflected by high positive loadings for salaried (+.73) and civil service employees (+.66). Automobiles (+.73) also load highly indicative of the quality of living as well as pointing to an increased necessity for personal transportation in subrubia (DICKINSON, 1959) wherein mass transit may be less developed. The high loading for private telephones (+.81) is suggestive of a well-developed network of communication facilities. The high loading for households with two or more residences (+.73) may also point to postindustria’s high level of mobility and affluence.

Since the postindustrial climate lays claim to an ethos of equality, it is not surprising to find a higher loading for women employed in non-agricultural activity (+.40). Problems associated with postindustrial society emphasizing the „self” to the exclusion of strong social bonds, working even against the attachment of the nuclear family are evidenced by the high loading for the incidence of divorce (+.80). Similarly, the high loading for autos (+.73) may reflect a need for personal independence and mobility.

Factor (II) presents evidence for the empirical verification in West Germany of the industrial stage of modernization. As expected, indicators for mobility, affluence, communication, transportation and the bureaucracy do not load highly. Most German workers, however, would appear to earn high wages (+.79), (THIERFELDER, 1965: 41–42). The high positive loading for salaried employees (+.63) is suggestive of the role in West German society of the „false middle class” (DAHRENDORF, 1967: 92).

The high loading for industrial workers (+.72) on industrial Factor (II) certainly appears to differentiate this modernization stage from post-industrial Factor (I) on which the same variable loads negatively (−.44). Although measures for tolerance and civil rights in the industrial stage are reduced from those of the post-industrial dimension, societal bonds appear much stronger, including particularly those for the nuclear family. This is reflected by the diminished loading for the incidence of divorce (+.37). Industrial stage Factor (II) appears further differentiated from Factor (I) by density of population. In urban industria, the loading for density (+.66) is significantly higher than that for suburban postindustria (+.44). The moderate loading for small agricultural holdings (+.41) reflect the relatively large number of German industrial workers who on weekends and after work till individual parcels of land which cluster frequently on the fringes of West German urban centers. The traditional stage of modernization may appear on Factor (II) reflected by the high negative loadings for agriculturally employed (−.90) and self-employed (−.88).

Whereas the three developmental dimensions found on Factors (I) and (II) appear static, those variables which load positive and highly on Factor (III) suggest a dimension of dynamic developmental change or growth. Factor (IV), in contrast to the first three, is not developmental. Instead it seems to reflect conditions unique to postwar Germany: the flight of refugees and expelles, largely from Protestant east Germany, to the West following the Second World War. Not an immediate product itself of modernization, this dimension represents an important influence having affected developmental change in West Germany.

The two elections of 1965 and 1969 were chosen for analysis (Table Two) since it has been only during this period that the right-wing National Democratic Party (NPD) as yet has been politically significant at the federal level. Second, prior to the 1965 and subsequent to the 1969 elections, the electoral constituencies were redrawn drastically thereby invalidating any study using Wahl-
Table 2: A three Factor Analysis of the West German Vote, 1965 and 1969*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Support (%)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. SPD, 1965</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SPD, 1969</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CDU-CSU, 1965</td>
<td>-.92</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CDU-CSU, 1969</td>
<td>-.95</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. DFU, 1965</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ADF, 1969</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. FSU, 1965</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>-.46</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. FSU, 1969</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. NPD, 1965</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. NPD, 1969</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. FDP, 1965</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. FDP, 1969</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. AUD, 1965</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. EP, 1969</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. BP, 1969</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. CVP, 1965</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. UAP, 1965</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative Proportion of Total Variance (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30.44</td>
<td>44.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based upon a varimax orthogonal rotation of electoral results at the Wahlkreis level (N=214).

Table 3: A two Factor Analysis of Voting Turnout and Invalid Ballots in West German Elections, 1965 and 1969*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Variable (%)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting Turnout, 1965</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Turnout, 1969</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid Ballots, 1965</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid Ballots, 1969</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative Proportion of Total Variance (%)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based upon a varimax orthogonal rotation using Wahlkreis (N=214) level data.

Wahlkreis level data over a longer period. When the electoral data is factor analyzed, three political cleavages emerge explaining 57.98 percent of the total variation. The two major parties in West Germany, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), in Bavaria the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), are found locked in tight competition on the first factor. The two secondary West German political parties, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the NPD in contrast, each form their own dimension.

Factor analysis was employed (Table Three) for the same electoral period of 1965 and 1969 to analyze voting activity and void ballots. In this case the data reduced into two orthogonal components. As was the case with the party cleavages, a high amount of regional persistence was indicated for both dimensions. A total variation of 84.85 percent was accounted for by the two factors.

The following proposition for advanced societies:13

13 It is the postindustrial units which already most completely enjoy the benefits of modernization. Having gained the most from the socioeconomic system, they have the least to immediately gain from the political system. Under these conditions,
was drawn from the three stage spatial modernization theory:

Proposition 1 – The higher the socioeconomic level of modernity of a given spatial unit within an advanced society, the lower the level of voting activity.

Multiple regression was performed to test whether differing stages in socioeconomic modernization (b* = -.49) suggest that at the highest levels of development, low levels of voting activity are experienced (Benjamin, 1972). As expected, the industrial stage dimension does not display a high negative relationship with electoral participation (b* = +.12).

When these same dimensions are regressed against void ballots, 39 percent of the variation is accounted for. A negative relationship was found between the postindustrial dimension and invalid ballots (b* = -.28). If one considers invalid ballots a measure for anti-systemic behavior in West Germany (Kitzinger, 1964; Stiebold, 1965), this finding when coupled with the negative result for electoral activity, suggest postindustrial spatial units to be passively supportive of the system.

The regression analysis discloses two other important relationships. A negative weighting for the incidence of void ballots with the industrial dimension (b* = -.41) indicates industrial spatial units, as with the postindustrial units, to be high-

### Table 4: Standardized Regression Coefficients (b*) for Voting Turnout, Invalid Ballots, Refugee-Protestant and Development Factors in West Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Criteria</th>
<th>Voting Turnout</th>
<th>Invalid Ballots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postindustrial Dimension</td>
<td>-.49a</td>
<td>-.28a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Dimension</td>
<td>.12a</td>
<td>-.41a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth Dimension</td>
<td>-.12a</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee-Protestant Dimension</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.36a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (4,209)*</td>
<td>19.10</td>
<td>32.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aStandardized regression coefficient is at least twice its standard error.

+ F-values are significant at the .001 level.

in fact can predict voting participation (Table Four). When voting activity is regressed on the regional-historic (refugee-Protestant) and developmental dimensions, Proposition One appears confirmed. The negative standardized regression coefficient\(^{14}\) for the postindustrial dimension as long as no threat of large-scale redistribution is directed against the postindustrial units, no need for political activity will be indicated by changes in levels of voting participation. Conversely, traditional stage spatial units will exhibit the highest levels of voting participation. It is the traditional stage spatial unit which seeks through the political process change and a more equitable distribution of the fruits of modernization. Industrial stage spatial units because of their median level of modernity are generally characterized by average relative levels of voting participation.

14 Standardized regression coefficients or beta weights (b*) are reported in Tables Four and Five. Since this study employs a total population rather than only a sample, beta weights are preferable to unstandardized b’s (Blalock, 1967). The standardized regression coefficient can be compared to tell the relative importance of each independent variable in predicting the dependent variable. The magnitude of the beta weights, obtained by multiplying the partial b coefficient by the ratio of the standard deviation of the independent variable by the standard deviation of the dependent variable, allows one to gauge the relative importance of each predictor variable.
ly supportive of the system. Because of the positive find for voting activity, industrial spatial units, on the other hand, appear to be increasingly active as well as supportive of the system. In addition, the negative relationship between void ballots and areas of refugee-Protestant concentration suggest that on the whole, such areas are generally well-integrated into the system.

To determine the overall pattern of spatial intra-nation modernization in West Germany, multiple regression was employed in a second analysis. This time the party cleavage structure was regressed against six predictor criteria (Table Five).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Criteria</th>
<th>SPD/CDU-CSU</th>
<th>Party Cleavage</th>
<th>NPD</th>
<th>FDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postindustrial Dimension</td>
<td>.15(^a)</td>
<td>.31(^a)</td>
<td>.28(^a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Dimension</td>
<td>.74(^a)</td>
<td>-.26(^a)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth Dimension</td>
<td>-.18(^a)</td>
<td>-.12(^a)</td>
<td>.29(^a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee-Protestant</td>
<td>.36(^a)</td>
<td>.44(^a)</td>
<td>.16(^a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Turnout</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.24(^a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid Ballots</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.42(^a)</td>
<td>.14(^a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (6,207)(^+)</td>
<td>85.28</td>
<td>22.86</td>
<td>16.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Standardized regression coefficient is at least twice its standard error.

\(^+\) F-values are significant at the .001 level.

On the main West German cleavage, 71 percent of the explanatory variance is accounted for by the independent dimensions. The Social Democratic Party, identified by the positive sign, is associated closely with the industrial stage of modernity (b\(^*\) = .74). Additional support for the SPD is found in areas of refugee-Protestant concentration (b\(^*\) = .36). With regard to the two major parties the Social Democrats appear the most successful as a competitor for support from postindustrial spatial units (b\(^*\) = .15). Indicated by the negative sign, the CDU-CSU is associated with areas of reduced refugee-Protestant concentration, with the traditional stage of modernity, and to a lesser extent, with areas experiencing developmental change or growth (b\(^*\) = -.18).

Previous studies have linked (what may be consi-

dered) indicators for the traditional stage with the CDU-CSU. LINZ (1967) and EDINGER (1968) have commented CDU-CSU support to have rested with independent farmers, artisans businessmen, devout Catholics, the upper class and the older age groups. CONRADT (1972: 29) found a trend associating increases in ruralization, also a traditional stage indicator, with increases in support for the CDU-CSU. Social Democratic support, on the other hand, has been linked to the industrial stage of modernization. Increases for the SPD, for example, were found correlated with increases in urbanization (CONRADT, 1972: 23) and secularization (KLINGEMANN and PAPPI, 1970).

Support for the National Democrats during this same period was strongest in areas of refugee-Protestant concentration (b\(^*\) = +.44). The NPD appears also to have gained support politically from areas exhibiting higher incidents of void ballots (b\(^*\) = +.42), from postindustrial spatial units (b\(^*\) = +.31), and from traditional spatial units (b\(^*\) = -.26). Limited evidence is offered also suggesting the National Democrats not to have profited from areas experiencing developmental growth (b\(^*\) = -.12).

The Free Democratic Party was best predicted by areas experiencing developmental change or growth (b\(^*\) = +.29). In addition, the FDP appears to have attracted support from postindustrial spatial units (b\(^*\) = +.28). The Free Democrats are associated also with areas of low voter turn-
out \( (b^* = -0.24) \) and weakly with areas of refugee-Protestant concentration \( (b^* = +0.16) \).\(^{15}\)

One may conclude overall from these findings that each developmental stage of modernization can be associated with one or more of the four West German political parties discussed above. The industrial modernization stage appears to be almost exclusively represented by the Social Democratic Party. The traditional stage is largely the domain of the CDU-CSU, but did lend restricted support to the NPD. The postindustrial stage, in contrast to the two other stages, could not be claimed by a single party but during this period was most supportive of both the NPD and the Free Democrats.

Although multiple regression is a powerful research tool, only one dependent variable at a time can be assessed by the independent variables. In addition, theoretical distortion may be introduced with regression analysis if the dependent variable is removed from its systemic influences. Then too, regression analysis does not allow for a measurement of association for the dependent variables at the point of their interaction with the independent variables.

With these difficulties in mind and desiring a measure which could account for the complexity of system-wide spatial modernity variation, it was decided to utilize a more appropriate technique — canonical correlation (McHale and Partch, 1975). Canonical ecology permits the researcher to investigate a number of dependent variables at the point of their interaction with a number of independent variables, while providing a measure of correlation between each set (domain) of variables. In short, canonical ecology provides the means for handling system-wide complexity.

Presented in Table Six, Modernization Context (I) is the dominant modernization context in West Germany. The \( R_{\text{cmax}} = 0.88 \) is a measure of the degree of maximum correlation between the two canonical variates. The set of "independent variables" is defined socioeconomically by the traditional and industrial modernization dimensions, indicated by the canonical weighting (+0.92) which may be interpreted as a standardized regression coefficient \( (b^*) \). Modernization Context (I) is defined politically by the weighting for the SPD/CDU-CSU cleavage (+0.89) and to a lesser extent by the NPD (+0.26). The National Democrats, as with the results for the regression analysis, were found to compete against the Christian Democrats on the traditional stage dimension. The total overall socioeconomic and political importance in West Germany of this context can be gauged when it is recalled that the two major political parties in the 1965 and 1969 federal elections together averaged about 90 percent of the vote.

By definition the first canonical correlation is the strongest possible pattern, but if it does not account for all the relationship between the two domains, new linear composites will be processed accounting for residual relationships. The canonical correlation \( (R_{c2} = 0.75) \) for Modernization Context (II) may be considered still quite high.

The highest political weighting on this context is that of the National Democratic Party. The NPD has been viewed as a contemporary version of a nazi or fascist party (Warnecke, 1970), as filling the political vacuum left behind by the Social Democrats after their move from an opposition role to that of a ruling party as members of the Great Coalition (Kühnl et al., 1969), and as a unifying movement composed of rightwing splinter groups representing anti-systemic and anti-modernization tendencies (Nagle, 1970). On Modernization Context (II) the National Democrats (+0.66) and Free Democrats (+0.41) appear together as parties of the "loyal opposition" — both work within the parameters of the system. They do not oppose the system itself, but only the policies of the dominant party cleavage. As indicative to the lack of anti-systemic behavior, invalid ballots weight highly and negative (-0.67).

\(^{15}\) A variety of curvilinearity tests were applied as the predictor criteria including the use of logarithms, reciprocal functions and simple parabolas. The best possible equation using a curvilinear relation raised the total \( R^2 \) for the three electoral cleavages as follows: the SPD/CDU-CSU from 71 to 75 per cent, the NPD from 40 to 46 per cent, and the FDP from 32 to 35 per cent. Because only slight increases were found, the linear relations were retained. The theoretical implications of curvilinearity in electoral support is discussed by Przeworski and Soares (1971).
Table 6: A Canonical Correlation of Party Cleavages, Development Factors, the Refugee-Protestant Dimension, Patterns of Electoral Activity and Void Ballots in West Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Cleavage Domain</th>
<th>Modernization Context (I)</th>
<th>Dominant Modernization Context</th>
<th>Socioeconomic Developmental and Regional-Historic Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPD/CDU-CSU</td>
<td>+.89</td>
<td>$R_{c_{max}} = .88$</td>
<td>+.12 Postindustrial Dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>$X^2 = 543.6$</td>
<td>+.92 Industrial Dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>$df = 20, p = .001$</td>
<td>-.19 Growth Dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>+.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>+.32 Refugee-Protestant Dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Cleavage Domain</th>
<th>Modernization Context (II)</th>
<th>Loyal Opposition Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPD/CDU-CSU</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>$R_{c_2} = .75$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>+.66</td>
<td>$X^2 = 229.3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>+.41</td>
<td>$df = 12, p = .001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid</td>
<td>-.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Cleavage Domain</th>
<th>Modernization Context (III)</th>
<th>Anti-Systemic Context</th>
<th>Socioeconomic Developmental and Regional-Historic Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPD/CDU-CSU</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>$R_{c_3} = .44$</td>
<td>-.39 Postindustrial Dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>+.74</td>
<td>$X^2 = 57.6$</td>
<td>-.28 Industrial Dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>-.49</td>
<td>$df = 6, p = .001$</td>
<td>-.68 Growth Dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>+.39</td>
<td></td>
<td>+.55 Refugee-Protestant Dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The loyal opposition context is largely defined socioeconomically by a high canonical weighting for the postindustrial dimension (+.78). Under conditions in which the postindustrial spatial units are not the political majority it may be recalled that their role is to oppose the policies of the ruling parties. They do not seek to overthrow the system in which they are seen as having accrued the highest relative proportion of benefits. Instead their goal is to work within the system seeking to build an eventual political majority.

Modernization Context (III) in contrast is the anti-systemic context in West Germany. The canonical correlation is not as strong as that of previous contexts ($R_{c_3} = .44$). The postindustrial dimension weights negatively (-.39), and when coupled with the finding for the industrial context (-.28), suggests this modernization context to be at the lowest levels of development. The negative finding for the growth dimension (-.68) suggest such areas also to be experiencing stagnation. Modernization Context (III) in short, is the equivalent in West Germany of the first traditional submodel.

The anti-systemic modernization context in West Germany is clearly represented politically in this period by the NPD (+.74). HARTMAN (1970: 636) among others has suggested that the National Democrats for both programmatic and strategic reasons (e.g., Article 21) have purposely

16 Article 21 provides that only those parties which receive five per cent or more of the total vote,
cultivated an image intended to create public confusion as to the party’s ultimate objectives. This is the "second face" of the NPD. On this modernization context, the party represents areas least modernized and not modernizing — areas apparently hostile to the present system. As one might expect, the two parties which obviously best represent the system, the SPD and CDU-CSU, do not weight on the anti-systemic context (-0.00). The FDP weights negatively (-0.49). 17

Finally, two other findings warrant mention. First, the refugee-Protestant dimension weights positively on all three modernization contexts. One might conclude this to suggest somewhat differing levels during this period of refugee integration into West German society. Second, Proposition One, which holds that the higher the socioeconomic level of modernity of a given spatial unit within an advanced society, the lower the level of voting activity; is further supported by the finding reported in Table Six. At the highest stage of modernization, context (II), voting turnout weights negatively (-0.35). At the lower stages, Modernization Context (I), no significant relationship is found (+0.01); while at the lowest stage, Modernization Context (III), a positive relationship is indicated (+0.39).

VI. Concluding Remarks

The evidence presented above, in the West German case at least, seems to bear out the three stage spatial theory of intra-nation modernization. The Social Democratic Party appear to electorally represent the industrial stage of modernization. The Christian Democrats may be considered the

or at least three seats in the direct election, can be represented in the Bundestag. It has been suggested that Article 21 has been an important force responsible for eliminating a number of smaller parties. See POLLOCK (1955).

17 The SPD/CDU-CSU cleavage does not weight on Modernization Context (III), in contrast to the FDP's negative weighting, yet the difference is statistical rather than substantive. The difference is that the SPD/CDU-CSU cleavage is indicated on a single dimension. The major analytical drawback from this condition is that unless the two elements are diametrically opposed for the context being measured, the strength of the negative relationship cannot be determined for either.

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